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Summary  findings
For a World Bank Institute course on transport  majority divestiture; management contracts; and BOT
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* Eco1zomic  characteristics of airports. Three types of  * Price  regulation. Topics covered include traditional
activities are carried out in airports:  essential operational  pricing policies; price regulation through  an RPI-X
services (aeronautical and non-aeronautical), handling  formula; charges for congestion, noise, and other
services (aeronautical and non-aeronautical), and  externalities; investment plans; and design of the
commercial activities.  regulatory system.
Demand for basic airport services is directly influenced
by trip purpose. The two types of airline customers  * Regulation of quality in the industry. Topics covered:
(business and leisure travelers) need different levels of  regulation of services to passengers (as measured by
flexibility and tend to travel at different times. Analyzing  targets for check-in queues, immigration queues, baggage
airport capacity (practical and saturation) under peak  reclaim queues, concourse crowding, shopping, parking,
demand is essential to airport success.  and so on); fault repair times; average levels of passenger
Among other important issues: Runway costs, level  boarding and disembarkation and baggage delivery;
and volume of service, pollution, congestion, and air  safety; and investment obligations.
traffic control.
Performance indicators in the industry. Topics
Recent trends in the airport industry. The movement  covered: strategic indicators and other financial
toward privatization may involve public ownership and  indicators (including revenues), as well as indicators of
private operation, including joint ventures; partial or  cost, productivity, and quality of service.
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ii1.- AIRPORTS  AND ITS ECONOMIC  CHARACTERISTICS
1.1.- The multi-product  nature of the activity
Airports are complex and multi-product enterprises. Each airport comprises one or
several  runways, a  set  of  aprons  and  taxiways, a  terminal  building through  which
passengers and freight are separately processed, and a control tower. Each of these parts
develop specific activities that once combined, allow the interchange between air and land
transport modes. Nevertheless,  an airport is something more beyond a simple interchanger
for modes of  transport. It is a system that serves a wide range of needs related to the
movement of persons and things world-wide. Its development depends upon 4 crucial
elements: passengers and goods that circulate through its terminals; its physical, social and
economic environment; its nature as a productive and business generator unit; and agents
that operate in it, mainly airlines and franchisees  of commercial  services.
Activities carried out at an airport may be classified into three distinct groups:
essential operational services and facilities, handling services and commercial activities
(see Table 1.1).' Alternatively, the first two are commonly referred to  as aeronautical
services, while the later are considered non-aeronautical.
Essential operational services include the air traffic control system, meteorological
services, telecommunications,  police and security, fire, ambulance and first aid services,
and  runways, aprons, taxiways, grounds and buildings maintenance. These activities
determine  the degree of safety in airport operations, and hence, are considered essential and
at the core of the airport business.  Handling services  refer to a great variety of activities.
We can distinguish between those that are directly related to the aircraft (ground and ramp
handling), such as cleaning, the provision of power and fuel, and the loading and unloading
of luggage and freight; and those that are more traffic related (traffic handling), such as the
processing of passengers, baggage and freight through the  terminal building. Finally,
commercial  services involve a large variety of different activities that may be located either
at the terminal building or around the airport. Duty free shops and other retail shopping,
restaurants and bars, leisure services, hotel accommodation,  banks, car rental and parking
services, and  conference and  communication facilities, are examples of the myriad of
activities that are included in the non-aeronautical  set of airport operations.
Airlines are also involved in the commercial side of  airport activities. Carriers
usually need an office at the airport, a need that should be considered from a regulator's
point of view. Under scarce space conditions in terminals, the relevant question is how to
ensure a place for every carrier. A transparent, competitive  process should ensure that most
interested airlines receive space, and in some cases, these airlines may also represent more
minor airlines.
'See  Doganis (1992).
1Table 1.1. Classification  of Airport Activities.
Operation  Handling  4t1minereia1
1. Air traffic control  1. Aircraft  cleaning  1. Duty free shops
2. Meteorological  services  2. Provision of power and fuel  2. Other retailing shopping
3. Telecommunication  3. Luggage and freight loading and unloading  3. Restaurants and bars
4. Police and security  4.  Processing  of  passengers, baggage  and  4. Leisure services
freight
5. Fire, ambulance and first aid services  5. Hotel accommodation
6. Runway, apron and taxiway maintenance  6. Banks
7. Car rental and parking
8. Conference and communication facilities
Aeronautical  or airside services  Non aeronautical or landside services
2Traditionally, airports  have  been  owned  and  operated  by  central  or  local
governments, including, in some instances, even through a branch of the army. Airport
infrastructure  was commonly believed to be a public utility, which supported this type of
property arrangement.  However, due to public budget constraints and efficiency concerns,  a
reconsideration  of this type of model has occurred, and nowadays the range of possibilities
for private sector involvement  in airports may be as wide as the range of airport activities
themselves.
The classification used in Table 1.1 is not always applicable to all airport activities.
Sometimes  the criteria that allows a separation of one type of service from another becomes
blurred. Aeronautical or airside activities focus on the operation of aircraft, and on the
movement of passengers and freight; while the non-aeronautical  or landside activities are
connected  to commercial operations that occur at the terminal and on airport land, usually
under a  concession contract. Any concession that relates to  aircraft or traffic handling
would  share  some  features  with  aeronautical  and  non-aeronautical services.  Fuel
concessions and passenger and freight handling, when provided by an airport agent, are
examples of activities that would not fit into the above table. Therefore, the classification
shown in Table 1.1 should  be regarded as tentative.
1.2.- Airport revenues
Assuming that any sorting problems with airport activities are solved, revenues
arising from these services are also classified as aeronautical  and non-aeronautical.  There is
a relationship  between airport size and revenue generation sources; bigger airports are more
capable of exploiting commercial activities and hence, obtain more revenue from this
source. In contrast, small airports tend to  be almost entirely dependent on aeronautical
revenues. Empirical evidence for this type of relationship in regard to Spanish airports is
shown in Table 1.2 and corresponding  Figure 1.1.
According to Doganis (1992), when an airport reaches the ten million passengers
threshold, commercial  revenues represent between 50% and 60% of total income. However,
US airports are exceptional, and between 70% and 80% of total income is typically due to
commercial  revenues. Such differences are primarily due to American airports leasing out
terminals,  hangars and other facilities to airlines.
More relevant is the relationship  found between the type of ownership and revenue
generation.  The arrival of the private sector into airport operations has led to what is called
the  commercial airport  model,  where  the  infrastructure is  regarded  as  a  business
opportunity, and  as  such,  something beyond a  traditional airport. Meetings, visitors,
employees, local residents, and local businesses and industries would also be important
potential customers  for airport commercial  services.  From this point of view, the greater the
involvement of the private sector in airport activities, the greater the importance of non-
aeronautical sources of revenue. As Table 1.3 shows, this is what is occurring, except at
regional airports,  which for this sample are mainly located in the US.
3Table  1.2. Airports  size and  revenue  sources.  The  Spanish  case (1997)
Madrid/Barajas  23,122  58  42
Palma de Mallorca  16,449  64  36
Barcelona  14,561  60  40
Gran Canaria  7,927  68  32
Tenerife Sur  7,438  71  29
Malaga  7,190  55  45
Alicante  4,398  56  44
Lanzarote  4,005  77  23
Ibiza  3,528  61  39
Fuerteventura  2,440  71  29
Menorca  2,232  62  38
Tenerife Norte  2,042  63  37
Bilbao  1,970  65  3  5
Valencia  1,912  60  40
Sevilla  1,543  57  43
Santiago  1,283  61  39
Almeria  714  68  32
La Palma  696  67  33
Asturias  595  54  46
Vigo  556  67  33
Reus  518  75  25
Gerona  507  66  34
Jerez  453  56  44
Granada  447  59  41
La Corufia  398  62  38
Melilla  352  80  20
Pamplona  288  7 1  29
Zaragoza  244  71  29
Santander  204  72  28
Valladolid  191  82  18
San Sebastian  173  70  30
Vitoria  145  77  23
San Javier  108  71  29
El Hierro  97  39  61
Salamanca  44  74  26
Badajoz  18  64  36
TOTAL  AVERAGE  65  35
Source: AENA
2 Including  handling.
4Figure 1.1. Airports size and revenue  sources. The Spanish case (1997)
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Table 1.3 Traffic and revenue distribution.  Selected airoorts 3
Annual aircraft  78  165  391  169  188
movements
(thousands)______
No. of passengers  6.6  11.9  28.4  12.0  11.1
(millions)
Airside revenues as  70%  50%  36%  62%  43%
percentage of total
revenues____  ___
Landside revenues as  30%  50%  64%  38%  57%
percentage of total
revenues  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source: Kapur (1995).
_
3Different  airport ownership structures are  defined and  analyzed at  section  3.  Selected airports are:
Government Department: Buenos Aires, Santiago, Mexico City, Quito,  Libreville, Nairobi, Budapest,
Athens, Gothenburg, New Delhi, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. Public Corporation: Sydney,
Auckland,  Singapore, Rio  de  Janeiro,  Amsterdam, Madrid,  Vancouver and  Montego  Bay.  Regional
Government:  Washington, Boston, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Dallas, Miami, Orlando, Paris and Basel-
Mulhouse. Public-Private:  Toronto, Vienna, Rome, Copenhagen, Zurich and Yaounde. Private: Heathrow,
Gatwick, Stansted, Aberdeen, Edinburgh,  Glasgow  and Southamnpton.
51.3.- The nature of airport demand
Demand for basic airport services such as aircraft landings is directly influenced  by
the air transport market, which in turn depends upon trip purpose. Hence, it is considered  a
derived demand. A demand for landings is generally quite price inelastic, 4 due to the fact
that airports usually do not have a local competitor and that airport charges represent a
small proportion  of airlines direct operating costs.'
As  Walters (1978) noted, air transport demand is  subject to two  motivations -
business and leisure. Therefore, we can distinguish  at least two distinctly different types of
airline consumers: business and leisure travelers. Each group may also be divided into
different  sub-categories. For  instance,  for  business passengers, we  could  distinguish
between those who need complete flexibility and others that travel according to plans. In
regard to leisure customers, there are people travelling to holiday resorts'and others that
travel to visit relatives and friends.
These groups show different behavior in the market.  Leisure travelers are quite
price responsive, while business passengers tend to be less sensitive, although not totally
price inelastic. Business  travelers are also more influenced  by the convenience  of schedules,
as they usually book their ticket at the last minute and might need to alter the booking
frequently. Business trips are concentrated in the early morning and late evening hours,
while the leisure traffic principally  appears in the weekends and holiday periods.
Consequently, airport  service  demand is  characterized by  peak  and  off-peak
fluctuations, which can be found by day, by week and by seasonal periods. Such a peak
nature of demand would strain airport capacity. Furthermore, if the spectacular growth in
the air transport sector is also taken into account, the analysis of airport capacity becomes
an essential element of airport features.
1.4.- Capacity  constraints
The  term  capacity refers  to  the  ability  of  a  component  of  the  airfield  to
accommodate aircraft movements. It is expressed in terms of operations per unit of time,
usually per hour.  For instance, the hourly capacity of the runway system will be the
maximum number of aircraft's that can be processed in an hour according to a  set of
specified operating conditions. 6 Therefore, when  evaluating airport capacity, terminal
building and runway system capacities should be individually studied, although the latter is
usually considered the main determinant of total system capacity. 7 There are four main
factors affecting runway capacity: air traffic control, demand, meteorological conditions
around the airport, and the design and configuration  of runways.
Two basic concepts of runway capacity may be  applied: practical capacity and
saturation capacity. Practical capacity relates to the number of operations that can be done
'  See, for instance, Morrison (1982).
5Doganis  (1991) for ICAO airlines reports a percentage around 5% for airport and en route fees.
6 The concept of runway capacity applied here is that of saturation as presented below.
' See Ashford and Wright (1992).
6in a period of time without imposing an average delay that exceeds a pre-established  or
reasonable level, for instance delays  to departing flights average four minutes at peak hours.
On the other hand, saturation capacity refers to the maximum number of aircraft that  can
be served in a given period of time under continuous  demand conditions.
Airports are productive units whose capacities can only be increased through the
incorporation of  large and indivisible units. If  runway capacity at a  given airport is
equivalent to a maximum number of  "n" airplanes per period, and the airport operates
below that level, the cost of operating an additional plane would be equal or close to zero.
However, if such an airport operates at full capacity, to increase traffic would require the
construction of a  new runway. Therefore, if traffic volume at peak periods increases
sharply, obliging the construction of another runway, this would imply capacity under-
utilization at off-peak hours. Fluctuations in demand for airport services and investment
indivisibilities,  leads inevitably to excess capacity, with important repercussions on the cost
structure of the airport industry. Peak period pricing, however, may help to  lessen that
problem and allow for more efficient capacity allocation.
The shape of the cost curve for runways exhibits a positive slope for traffic volumes
below  available  capacity.  Instead,  once  capacity  is  surpassed,  the  cost  grows
asymptotically.  This cost is known as capacity  cost and its behavior is shown at Figure 1.2.
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Source:  Walters (1978).
Terminal building capacity is becoming more important as non-aeronautical  airport
services are given a greater weight as a result of the emerging role of the private sector.
Commercial and other activities carried out in the terminal building require large spaces.
This capacity can be evaluated by considering  two important  variables: level of service and
volume  of service.
Level  of  service  is  closely  linked  to  quality.  Space,  waiting  time,  comfort
experienced  by users or treatment provided by airport staff, are all determinants  of quality.
7The evaluation of these factors implies subjective elements. For this reason, most studies
utilize time of service and level of congestion as proxies for this variable. Volume of
service, the second parameter to be considered, refers to the number of users that can be
served given a selected level of service.
From the airport point of view, the importance of establishing an adequate level of
service stems from the fact that the time wasted by passengers waiting in line renders a
large amount of resources useless. For instance, the greater the time required for the check-
in procedures, the less time available to engage in last minute shopping in the commercial
area of the airport.
A shortage of capacity at airports translates into increasing congestion and delays.
The immediate consequences for users are increasing costs, and decreasing quality of
services and  safety. However, providing additional capacity in  order to  meet  demand
requirements  has important implications  for the airport costs structure.
An alternative mechanism to meeting demand is to allocate flight and gate slots.
While flight  slots  refer to  landing  and  departure times,  gate  slots  concern terminal
utilization. When allocated, both types have to be jointly  considered, otherwise delays
occur as  recently landed aircraft wait  until  a  gate  becomes available. Traditionally,
incumbent airlines have been the de facto proprietors of slots.  These airlines have been
using them for such a long time that almost any national law recognizes their property right
or grandfather right based on regular utilization. This is the criterion recommended and
accepted  by IATA members.
In a  deregulated air transport environment aimed at increasing competition, the
support of grandfather rights makes little sense. In fact, it constitutes a very efficient market
entry barrier. Nevertheless, airport slots may be allocated according to  other methods.
Hence, a  second possibility is  a  slot  auction, in  which  airlines bid  for  a  slot or  a
combination of slots. This mechanism ensures that the airport authority gets the highest
possible  price.  However,  the  implementation of  the  auction  is  complicated when
grandfather rights are in place.  Airlines that have such rights would not  submit to an
auction unless they are legally obliged to. Typically, in such situations only newly created
slots or those lost under a use it or loose it principle would be available for the auction. 8
Furthermore, the allocation process requires that access to  other airports be considered.
Slots are so vital for airlines that they even trigger important international  alliances, such as
the one intended by British Airways and American Airlines, which recently became subject
to the scrutiny of the European Commission. The EC has demanded the disposal of 267
slots  at  Heathrow and  Gatwick airports as  a  price  for  approving the  alliance. The
prospective partners, in turn, have requested  that they be allowed to sell them.
1.5.- Airport costs
Airport costs may fall into two categories: those related to the terminal building and
those associated with the runways system. The first group depends on passenger flows at
the terminal building, while the second is determined by the number of processed aircraft.
This is the method selected by the European Union, and perhaps one of the main reasons that may explain
why competition  has not flourished  across Europe.
8Empirical evidence points out the existence of economies of scale in landing operations,
which means that as an airport increases its traffic, the cost per unit of traffic declines. On
the other hand, there are decreasing returns to scale when handling passengers inside the
terminal. The required time to process a passenger through a terminal increases with airport
size. Hence, the optimal dimension of an airport would depend upon a delicate equilibrium
between  both elements  (Walters, 1978).
Airport costs are compound by labor, capital and other operational costs. Among
western European airports, staff or labor cost is the largest item, representing on average
around 42% of total cost. 9 In a few cases, where airport authorities  are involved in activities
usually undertaken by concessionaires, such as handling services, the percentage may rise
to 65%. The second major heading is given by capital charges (interest and depreciation).
For most European airports this figure varies between 20 and 35 per cent. In contrast, the
cost structure of US airports appears to be quite different. Staff costs have a weight that on
average may reach 22%, with capital charges increasing to  44% of total  costs. These
differences can be explained by the different way both groups operate. For instance, labor
cost contrasts may be explained by the common practice at many US airports of renting
terminals and other facilities to airlines, which sometimes may even own the facility. The
fact that handling activities are usually carried out by concessionaires also contributes to
labor cost contrasts.  Regarding differences  in capital charges, it should be noted that capital
bond markets have been frequently utilized by US airports to finance their development.
Europeans,  however, have been more dependent on government  budget allocations.
1.6.- The problem of externalities  at airports
When users of airport infrastructures  impose a cost/benefit upon non-users (or even
upon other users on the system), it is said that there is an externality. In other words, airport
users are not bearing all the costs  generated by the  services they require. Regarding
negatives or bad externalities, it is noise to which most airport externalities studies have
been devoted (see Walters, 1978; Nelson, 1980; Levesque, 1994). However, pollution and
congestion are also bad externalities that cannot be neglected from a regulator's point of
view.
The main  economic problem of  externalities is  quantification and  subsequent
valuation. For example, a highly sophisticated technology is required to measure aircraft
pollutants emissions. Regarding noise, measurement is not an easy matter either. However,
accousticians have devised ordinal scales constructed as weighted averages of the high
frequency  peak noise and the number of times at which the noise of an aircraft is heard.'° In
order to measure congestion," this has to be linked to airport capacity (see above). Taking
capacity as a given, there is an international  standard for aircraft movements of an average
delay not exceeding  four minutes. Longer aircraft waiting times would indicate congestion
problems, which may be also measured by using weighted averages.
9  See Doganis (1992).
For example:  The  Noise  Number  Index  in  the UK,  the Composite  Noise  Rating  and  the Noise  Exposure
Forecast  in  the US,  and the Isosophique  in  France.
" Congestion  is a type of negative externality  imposed  upon other  users in the system.
9Once the measurement  task is completed, the emerging question is that of valuation.
Since we are considering costs imposed by users upon non-users we would have to take
into account people's  own judgement about suffered damage. Although the subjective
nature of such a judgement makes valuation very difficult, economists have developed
several tools that would allow for a more or less accurate valuation.' 2
It has been argued that almost all the problems caused by noise around airports are
reflected by lower property values. Hence, ceteris paribus comparisons  between noisy and
quiet houses would provide a market valuation of quiet. According to Walter (1975), the
price of noisy houses near an airport may be 30% less than equivalent homes in quiet areas.
Nevertheless, this  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable controversy for  the  reasons
explained  above.
Aiming to solve or lessen the noise externality, which is perhaps the most dominant
negative externality, some airport authorities have restricted the number of night operations
or even established landing charges according to the amount of noise emissions. This last
option constitutes an alternative  for internalization  of the bad externality. By paying for the
disturbance incurred, airlines are bearing the true social costs. Of course, the problems of
quantification  and valuation remain.
1.7.- The air traffic control
The air traffic control (ATC) has usually remained under government control and
outside of privatization schemes. Nevertheless, this trend is changing. For instance, the
ATC in New Zealand (see Box 1.1.) has been corporatized, and is operated by a limited
liability company with two shareholders,  the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State-
Owned Enterprises. Canada went  even further (see  Box  1.2). In  1996, the  Canadian
Government sold its  ATC to  a private operator, Nav  Canada, which is subject to  an
economic regulatory regime.  Most ATC systems, however, have not  been privatized
because of a fear that safety standards could be compromised by commercial pressures.
This was also the same fear expressed by opponents of airline deregulation. In this context,
there are two possible views;" 3 the market-failure view and the market-response view.
According to the former, privatized airlines or ATC private operators would face negative
financial and safety incentives,  suggesting that they would be inclined to reduce their safety
expenses in order to increase profits. The second view suggests that given that outputs of
reduced safety can be perfectly observed in the form of accidents, consumers will use them
as good indicators of an operators' level of safety, and hence would penalize negligent
firms, which might even be obliged to leave the industry. For the airline industry, there is
enough evidence  to support both views." 4 The actual industry safety levels are influenced  by
both the market-failure and market-response views, indicating that safety regulation is
necessary, although in  practice, it  has  been imperfect and  complemented by  market
mechanisms. These considerations should be taken into account when privatizing ATC
systems.
12 Christensen et al. (1998) is a very good review for those interested  in externalities.
13 See Chalk (1993).
'4 See for instance, Rose (1990) and Borenstein and Zimmerman  (1988).
10Box 1.1. ATC: The case of New Zealand
During the 80s, the public provision of services in New Zealand experienced a radical reform. The air
traffic control service, which was operated by the Civil Aviation Department,  was transformed into a commercially
oriented corporation.  The new organization, Airways Corporation, had to assume responsibility for its management.
The cost coverage and the provision of services  required by users were two of the proposed  objectives.
The need to be financially autonomous compelled the Airways Corporation to adopt a new performance
philosophy. Previous to  the introduction of  the new commercial orientation, service managers tried to please
politicians, since they controlled funding. However, the change in approach resulted in more attention focused upon
users. Frequently, users were consulted regarding areas such as fare structure, the introduction of new technologies,
and safety measures. The new approach permitted a greater flexibility in decision making regarding the services
users needed.
Detractors of the ATC corporatization program were concemed about safety, assuming that standards would
decrease as result of profitability pressures to reduce costs. In other words, they detected a conflict between safety
and commercial goals. Nevertheless, in New Zealand, it appears that the market may discipline such behavior.
Conforming to certain standards is necessary, otherwise consumers would switch to other transport modes, avoiding
airports and air carriers  reputed to be unsafe.
Among the main achievements of the ATC corporatization in New Zealand are the provision of services at a
substantially lower cost, a reduction of fares, service improvements  that allow users to obtain cost savings, and the
adoption of new technologies and services. An important element that may help to explain the success of this
approach is the inclusion in the board of directors of people with experience in both the public and private sectors.
Another relevant aspect was that politicians and the govemment were resolute in their commitment to change. The
govermnent recognition that a commercial approach can provide a more efficient service was a key element in the
transition process. Indeed, Airways Corporation is accepted by the private sector in New Zealand as one of the best
managed public enterprises  in the country.
Box 1.2. ATC: The case of Canada
In the Canadian case, the process of establishing a commercial approach to air traffic control was the result of
users demands, which required the provision of a more efficient service. At the same time, corporatization of the
ATC was also part of a govemmental initiative  that aimed to promote the modemization of transport infrastructures
and a more rational use of resources in Canada.
Problems associated with the service included; users not paying the true value, and managers subject to rigid
public rules and, hence, they lacked the flexibility required by market conditions. In addition, the labor force was
over-dimensioned  with regard to service needs. Finally, the slow and bureaucratic investments approval process
made it very difficult  to incorporate  new technologies into the system in accordance  with market needs.
For  all of these reasons, in  1995 the Canadian government announced the commercialization of  the air
navigation system. The government established a set of principles to be assumed by the new operator. Among these
were: preserve and promote aviation safety, improve efficiency of the system, allow access to all users, provide
service to  remote regions, comply with international obligations and operate the  service under a  commercial
approach with the aim of recouping all costs.
In turn, the government  committed itself to developing regulations  that would not affect the commercial interest
of the company. Nevertheless, some regulatory measures were adopted to prevent the firm from exploiting its
monopoly power. The aim was to promote efficiency through the application of self-regulatory mechanisms that
would give  consumers enough protection at  the lowest  regulation costs. A  consultation procedure was also
established in  order to  maintain equilibrium among participants and minimize disputes requiring third party
intervention. Finally, non-interference between the social and financial objectives was ensured. Such a regulatory
structure aimed to protect users'  interests, while guaranteeing enough flexibility for the firm to maneuver in a
commercial environment.
A report carried out by Corporate Services of Canada regarding the commercialization of the air navigation
system  noted that the experience was a great success for all parties involved. The industry maintained its safety level,
while at the same time, the system was improved to respond more efficiently to demand and technology changes.
Travelers and  users  benefited from  a  more  efficient service.  The government also  gained  from  efficiency
improvements while preserving  the public interest through its regulatory duties.
112. - RECENT  TRENDS IN THE AIRPORT  INDUSTRY
2.1.- The traditional model and regulation  of the industry
Traditionally, airports and airlines have been regarded as integrated and important
parts of the national air transport system. Both were considered public utilities. In welfare
terms, the benefits to society stemming from the operation of these services would always
compensate  for eventual  financial losses, and would thus justify corresponding  subsidies.
Under this airport model, operational  and handling activities are considered essential
to  the airport business, while commercial activities play a secondary role. Airports are
aimed at facilitating the interchange of transport modes, and not at exploiting passengers'
willingness to  pay  for  things  they  might  buy  at  other  and  more  adequate places.
Conveniently, airport assets, property and management are always in public hands, and
only  commercial  activities  may  sometimes  be  awarded  to  private  operators.
Concessionaires  usually pay a high canon because they are guaranteed exclusiveness  and
monopoly power. This pattern of concessioning commercial activities may lead to prices
being at least double than what they are outside of the airport.
Individual government regulation in this context is almost absent. Being airports,
and as such, a public monopoly, means that there is already enough interference, and as a
result,  economic regulations that  search for  efficiency are  regarded  as  unnecessary.
Nevertheless, due to the international  nature of air transport and the required coordination
of activities, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)' 5 has established some
regulatory principles regarding airports' pricing mechanisms (see  section 3) and  non-
discriminatory practices due  to  aircraft nationality. Other rules concern recognition of
aircraft certificates and the need to facilitate custom procedures. However, ICAO is much
more concerned about safety and security matters, both at the operators level and at the air
traffic control system.
2.2.- The movement  toward  privatization
When governments starts worrying about the burden of airport financing and the
lack of efficiency, the traditional model appears unsustainable. Nevertheless, most airports
around the world might still fit inside this model, and it is only since the 1  980s that things
have started to change. In Europe, for instance, the privatization wave has mainly taken the
form of corporatization  or partial or full divestitures (only BAA). Lack of public funds and
underdeveloped capital markets have made it very difficult to apply a  similar model to
developing economies, such as those in Latin America, Asia or Africa, where the selected
privatization  patterns have been in the form of concessions or management contracts.
If public monopolies are being turned into private monopolies, and if consumers'
interest are to be protected, some regulatory provisions are required. In this sense, there is
an  important question to  bear  in  mind.  Are  airport  infrastructures genuine  natural
monopolies, or due to its multi-product  nature should we distinguish those activities where
5 ICAO is an intergovermmental  institution that was created at the Chicago  Convention  in 1944.
12the exertion of monopoly power is very likely from others where the forces of competition
are feasible and desirable?  This takes us to the matter of unbundling  of airport activities.
In the strict sense, one airport would not be subject to competition until another
nearby airport begins to compete for traffic. However, if one considers that the services
carried out at airports are quite numerous, and also different in nature, perhaps there is some
other scope for the introduction of competitive forces. This is competition for the right to
serve the market.
As can be seen in  Table 2.1, most airport activities, with the exception of operational
services, may be subject to competitive  forces, at least in the form of competition for the
market. Hence, if this subcontracting  takes place, any concern regarding the exploitation of
monopoly power should mainly regard the operational  part of airport activities. This is the
reason  why most  regulatory provisions affecting airport charges  concentrate on  the
operational side of activities. In fact, most cases of airport pricing regulation, which occurs
through either discretionary or contract regulation, principally aim to control operational
charges  (see section 3).16
Table 2.1. Scope for competition  at airport services
---  Competitionft  the m#ket-  -:  -
Feasible  Desirable
Air traffic control*  YES  ?
Meteorological  services  NO  NO
Telecommunication  NO  NO
Police and security  YES  _
Fire, ambulance and first aid  YES  ?
Runway, apron and taxiway maintenance  YES  YES
Aircraft cleaning  YES  YES
Provision of power and fuel  YES  YES
Luggage and freight  loading and unloading  YES  YES
Processing  of passengers, baggage and freight  YES  YES
--.----- -Confinercila  .-
Duty free shops  YES  YES
Other retailing shopping  YES  YES
Restaurants  and bars  YES  YES
Leisure services  YES  YES
Hotel accommodation  YES  YES
Banks  YES  YES
Car rental and parking  YES  YES
Conference and communication  facilities  YES  YES
*:The ATC may be subject to other forms of private participation. A more detailed analysis is presented at
section 1.7.
6  An example of discretionary regulation is the one exerted over BAA airports. The term discretionary or
commissioned  regulation  are applied in the literature as synonymous.
13In spite of this, a closer look at handling and commercial activities may be useful.
Will the introduction  of competition  for the market be sufficient  to reduce monopoly  power,
or should some regulatory mechanism  be in place? Let us assume that an airport authority
concerned with maximizing  profit decides to concession  a given facility or service. 7 It may
award the concession to one or several competitive operators. For instance, it may allow
only  one handling agent to  operate the whole  airport, in  which  case the  monopoly
reproduces itself; or on the contrary, it may allow several competing agents to serve the
airport. Alternatively, it may allow only one or several restaurant operators to  cater the
whole airport. Therefore, a  regulator should also worry about these aspects of airport
operations, even if they represent only a small part of airport revenues. Table 2.2 illustrates
this idea.
Table 2.2. Monopoly power at airport  handling and commercial  activities
Concessioned  Not concessioned
One operator  Several operators
YES
YES  NO
Once a  regulator decides to  fix  prices it  should also  be  concerned about the
consequences  of the measures adopted. To what extent should airport quality be affected?
How could it measure and control airport performance in order to establish the degree of
regulation accomplishment?  As these questions are essential in any regulatory framework,
they are considered  in detail in sections  4 and 5.
2.3.- Experiences  in airport privatization
The traditional model of airports began to be reconsidered in 1987  when the British
Government decided to  take the  British Airport Authority (BAA) under full flotation,
except for a single Golden Share that was retained.  Nevertheless, when other governments
also chose to privatize their airports, they did not follow the same privatization path. The
British case has been unique so far. Therefore, in regard to airport privatization, it should be
kept in mind that a great variety of privatization  forms may fit into the airport infrastructure
case.
Different models of airport ownership and management  can be categorized as follows:" 8
*  Public ownership and public operations
*  Public ownership  and public operations with commercial  orientation
*  Regional ownership and operations
Of course, it might decide  just the opposite. In such a case the exertion of monopoly right is clear.
is These section relies on Kapur (1995).
14*  Public ownership with private operations: joint ventures, partial/majority divestitures,
management contracts,  BOT and similar concession  schemes,  etc.
*  Private ownership  and private operations.
2.3.1.- Public ownership  and public operations
This is the model that traditionally has been utilized to operate airports around the
world. Usually, a Civil Aviation Department, under the supervision of the Ministry of
Transport or even the Ministry of Defense, operates and owns most airports. The Comando
de Regiones Aereas (an arm of the Air Force) that owned, administered  and operated a total
of 400 airports in Argentina, has constituted, until recently, an extreme case of this type of
model. In general, most countries start airport services operation with the participation of
the army, although afterwards  they tend to distinguish between the control and operation of
military and civil air traffic services.
2.3.2.- Public ownership and public operations  with commercial  orientation
Also known as public corporations, this model aims to improve management and
airport finance autonomy, facilitating access to private capital markets. The British Airport
Authority, established in 1966 was the first authority operated according to such criteria.
The Israeli Airports Authority, Aeropuertos Espafioles y Navegaci6n Aerea (AENA) in
Spain, and INFRAERO in Brazil are other instances that fit into this model.
The  Spanish model  of  airports may  illustrate the  evolution  from  pure  State
ownership  to public corporations combined with a bit of private sector involvement. Until
1977,  the provision of airport and air traffic services was the responsibility of the Air Force;
afterwards,  activities were transferred  to the Government, so airport related activities were
operated by Organismo Aut6nomo de Aeropuertos, while air traffic services were managed
by another department of the Civil Aviation Authority.  Finally, in 1990 both were merged
to form AENA, a public company with autonomous status and under the tutorship of the
Department  of Transport.  Nevertheless,  AENA introduced some private participation  in the
financing and construction of new infrastructure. For instance, they have applied BOOT
schemes  (see below) for the construction of a new terminal at Palma de Mallorca in which
the selected developer was a joint venture company made up of a private promoter and
AENA itself. They have also constructed  a new cargo terminal at Barcelona airport.
Amsterdam Schiphol Airport in Holland is an interesting variant of this type of
model. The government holds 76% of participation,  the city of Amsterdam holds 22%, and
Rotterdam has the remaining. The airport follows a business oriented approach and has
financial  independence,  although  the government  may finance infrastructure  investments.  In
spite of its public nature, the airport has managed to sell bonds in the Euromarket,  getting a
triple "A" rating, the highest possible bond qualification.
152.3.3.- Regional ownership and operations
This is an alternative  to public ownership and operation by a national body. It seeks
to promote development for the airport region, and as a result, property is found either in
the hands of one or several local or regional entities. This approach has been used at
airports in the US (except for airports in Washington),' 9 the United Kingdom (but for BAA
airports) and France. Some local  governments may operate  several airports, such  as
Abroports  de Paris which has four, but generally,  it is normal to control  just one.
At US airports, in spite of being under local, regional or even state supervision, a
great deal of activities are contracted out to the private sector, which may assume 90% of
total airport activity. It is also interesting  to point out that debt financing for the funding of
infrastructure  projects has been commonplace at US airports. In order to guarantee this
debt, US  airports used to  keep long  term residual agreements with  the  airlines that
committed themselves to  covering airport operating costs and debt service. The usual
procedure was the following: each year the airport would calculate what part of the costs
could not be  covered by  non-airline revenues, with  the subsequent amount being the
payment required to air carriers. In turn, airlines would keep a great deal of operational
control at the airport, including exclusive gate use and the right to  approve all capital
improvement programs. The changes experienced in the air transport market after the
passage of the Deregulation Act in 1978 reduced the value of such guarantees, and since
then,  airports have  been  shifting  to  compensatory  agreements, which  give  airport
authorities greater control over operations and investment plans, allowing them to charge
airlines for the space used. US airports may also benefit from the Airport Improvement
Program (AIP) implemented  by the federal government.  Funds for the AIP come from taxes
and users fees.
2.3.4.- Public ownership  with private operations
Privatization policies  are undertaken to  promote efficiency in  a  public  budget
constraint  environment, and  are  often driven  by  disenchantment with  public  sector
performance. However, there is not a single model for airport privatization. The range of
possible  options  is  wide,  and  includes: joint  ventures,  partial/majority divestitures,
management  contracts, BOT and similar concession  schemes, etc.
- Joint  Ventures.  This was applied to Kansai International Airport (Japan), which
has  a  unique ownership structure. The Japanese  Government owns  ,  of  the
shareholdings,  with the rest belonging to 12 different local governments and more
than 800 private companies and individuals. The total project cost exceeded more
than US$20 billion, which included the construction of an artificial island. The
airport is administered as a private company, although with limited managerial and
financial  autonomy, and is under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport.
'9 Washington  National  and Dulles  Airports  remain federally  owned. In 1987 the Federal Government
established  the Metropolitan  Washington  Airport  Authority  (MWAA),  that was given a 50 year lease to
operate  both  airports.
16- Partial/Majority  divestitures.  The  govermment  reduces  its  equity  participation
either in part or to one single share (or even to zero shares). Shares divested could be
sold directly to local or regional governments  or to private individuals, or they could
go under public flotation. Divestitures are mainly used as a means of obtaining
private equity funding for future airport expansion. The only instance of majority
divestment is BAA, as mentioned earlier. Other instances of partial divestitures are
Zurich, Vienna and Copenhagen airports. Zurich airport in Switzerland is a very
interesting case because, although property is retained by the Canton of Zurich, the
airport is  operated by a  private company (Flughafen Immobilien Gessellschaft),
which in turn belongs to the Canton, with 50% of shares, and a group of private
individuals. Vienna airport in Austria, originally a public corporation, is today, after
a  partial divestiture, 48% in  public hands, which includes the participation of
Amsterdarn Schiphol airport. After BAA, it was the second airport quoted at the
stock exchange. Copenhagen  airport put 25% of shares under flotation in 1994.
- Management  contracts.  The management  of all or part of the airport is contracted
out to a specialized operator for a given period of time and under certain conditions
regarding performance,  maintenance, incentives and infrastructure investment. For
instance, Aeroports du Cameroon is  a  company created by  the government of
Cameroon to operate 7 of the 14 airports in the country for a 15 year period. This
company is participated by Aeroports de Paris, with 34% of shares, followed by the
Cameroon Govermnent with  24%. The remaining shares are distributed among
carriers and a major bank. Aroports  du Cameroon  is required to re-invest part of its
profits, although it can establish airport charges  after consulting the government  and
airport users.
- BOT  schemes  and  its variants.  A  BOT  (Build  Operate  Transfer)  scheme  occurs
when the government grants a concession or franchise to a private firm in order to
finance and build or modernize  a facility that will also be operated by the firm for a
certain period of time (20 to 50 years is a common period for airports). The private
operator will get corresponding  revenues and in turn it will assume all commercial
risk. When the concession  period expires, the facility will return to the government.
The concession contract may include some regulatory provisions regarding the
prices charged or the quality provided. This scheme and all its variants has been
widely used  for infrastructure development. For example, a  BOT  scheme was
utilized  by  the  Colombian  Government  in  1995  for  the  construction  and
maintenance of a second runway, as well as for the maintenance of an existing
runway at El Dorado Airport in Bogota. The US$100 million would be recovered by
the landing fee revenues collected during the 20 year concession  period. In this case,
the government assumed a great part of the risk, granting a minimum level of
revenues. The Colombian Civil Aviation would continue to  provide air traffic
control. However, the governments' absorption  of commercial  risk may represent a
difficult blueprint barrier for future privatization projects in Colombia. Indeed, it
seems plans  to  concession the  Cali  airport have  failed because bidders  were
expecting  the same sort of downside  protection.
Concession contracts are perhaps the most recent and innovative arrangement for
airports that allow for the benefits of private sector involvement. Another recent
example is given by the Argentine Government, which in February 1998 subscribed
17to a concession  contract with the consortium Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 regarding
a  set  of 33  airports, which were  all awarded to  the same concessionaire. The
concession period length was established at  30 years, with  a  10 year possible
extension included in the contract. Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 has the right to
collect some aeronautical charges 20 that are subject to economic regulation and that
were initially established for a five year period. Non aeronautical charges could be
set freely. The corresponding total annual payment to the Argentine Government
reaches US$171.121  million, an amount that will periodically be adjusted according
to the Producer Price Index. In addition, the consortium is required to invest a
minimum of US$2.1 billion. The group has already taken control of Buenos Aires
two airports, Eisesa and Aeroparque. The regulatory body specially created at the
time is the Organismo Regulador del  Sistema Nacional de Aeropuertos (ORSNA),
which among other tasks, will supervise airport fees and investment requirements
fulfillment. Another interesting example of an airport concession is provided by
Australia. 21 Twenty two  of the nation's  airports, which  were previously under
control of the Federal Airports Corporation, 22 have been or are currently being
leased for 50 year terms with an option for another 49 years. According to the
Australian Government each airport should, whenever possible, be sold separately
and remain subject to a regulatory framework. The government decided against the
use of an industry specific regulator, so the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission  will undertake regulatory duties.
Slightly different is a BOOT  (Build  Own  Operate  Transfer)  scheme. Under this
system, the  private  operator also retains  ownership of  the  facility  during the
concession period, usually in order to guarantee bank loans. Toronto's Lester B.
Pearson Airport's third terminal, with a capacity for 10 to  12 million passengers,
was developed under this type of arrangement. The deal included a 40 year land
lease, with an option to renew for a further 20 year period, a lump sum payment to
the  government  of  Cdn$30million, and  an  annual  lease  payment  based  on
developers gross revenues. Toronto's airport represents a rare combination of public
and private ownership and  operations. Terminals one and  two  are owned and
operated by the governmental body Transport Canada. Terminal three, however, is
privately owned, although it is operated under a management contract by Lockheed
Air terminal of Canada Inc. Transport  Canada coordinates activities and provides air
traffic control. It is also the proprietor of runways and taxiways. Since charges at
terminal three are twice as high as those at other terminals, the market seems to be
segmented, with  the  more  prestigious international carriers tending  to  utilize
terminal three, while the other terminals are mainly used by low-cost and regional
carriers. However, at the moment, the Canadian Government is reconsidering the
position of this airport and trying to re-nationalize  it again.
The  LDO  (Lease Develop  Operate)  scheme constitutes another alternative for
introducing  private participation at airports. It consists of a long term concession on
20 Other  aeronautical  charges  will correspond  to Comando  de Regiones  Aereas  that  will be in charge  of air
traffic  control.
21  To date, apart from Australia,  privatization  of airports in the Asia/Pacific  region is pretty much an
unknown.
22 Established  in 1988  as a Govermnent  Business  Enterprise.
18an existing facility. A private firm operates and upgrades or expands the facility,
obtaining revenues from operations, and pays rents back to the government, which
retains the property throughout  the concession  period. This type of arrangement  was
planned for La Chinita Airport in Maracaibo (Venezuela)  in 1993, although it was
unsuccessful due to a consortium breach of contract and changes in the political
situation.
2.3.5.- Private ownership  and private operations
This is exemplified by airports operated by the British Airports Authority. 23 BAA
used to be a public corporation  until 1987,  when the government, applying the Airports  Act,
decided to take 500 million shares under full flotation at a subscription  price of £2.40 each.
As mentioned  earlier, the government  kept a single share (golden  share), and 25% of equity
was reserved for employees.  In order to avoid capital concentration,  individual  participation
was limited to  15%. Initially, foreign capital participation was also limited, although it
reaches some 10%. Finally, private participation amounts to 95% of total shareholdings.
The Airports Act also provided for the regulation of BAA in order to avoid any monopoly
power exploitation. The  government appointed the  UK  Civil  Aviation  Authority as
regulator, although the  Monopolies and  Mergers Commission and the  Office of  Fair
Trading could review BAA activities as well.
Another example of full divestiture is provided by Belfast International Airport,
although the mechanism selected  by the government was a public tender. The winning bid
of US$72 was presented by a group of managers and employees, and in contrast to BAA, it
was not subject  to CAA scrutiny.
It is worth mentioning that occasionally a private sector company has chosen to
build and operate an airport by itself. London City Airport, developed by Mowlen, is an
example in Europe.
As we have seen, the range of possibilities for private sector involvement  in airports
is quite wide, and no one best practice model has emerged. The BAA case provides enough
evidence to  support full divestiture allowing for an improvement in  market efficiency.
Poole (1990) reports that the number of passengers handled per employee increased after
privatization, while at  the  same time  operating expenses declined. Nevertheless, the
procedure used to privatize BAA may not always be applicable. First of all, it requires
developed capital markets, which is quite rare in developing economies. It also needs a new
regulatory framework, which is  costly and not easy to  implement. Furthermore, when
governments wish for political reasons to retain property, such an option is not feasible.
These are the  main  reasons undermining the  appearance of  alternative privatization
procedures. Nevertheless, a dominant model that falls in the middle of the privatization
spectrum seems to be emerging, at least in Latin American countries, as shown in Table
2.4. This is the concession model in any of its variants. It seems to adequately provide
governments with much needed funds for airport infrastructure expansion. At the same
3  BAA  manages  the following  seven  airports:  Heathrow,  Gatwick,  Stansted,  Glasgow,  Edinburgh,  Aberdeen
and Southampton.
19time, it allows the government to keep property and get back facilities at the end of the
concession period. Furthermore, it  provides a  financial windfall for governments with
restricted  budgets.
Any concession process, however, is very complex and costly. The whole process,
beginning with the initiation of economic  and technical studies until the concession contract
is  ready, may  take  several  years.  In  addition, transparency when  awarding private
concessions is essential, otherwise, political corruption or lawsuits may be the likely final
outcomes.
20Table 2.3 Inventory of airport ownership structures in selected countries (Source: Kapur 1995)
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  PRIVATE PARTICIPATION
Government Department  Public Corporation  Regional  Government  Joint Public-Private  Private Ownership
_________________________  Ownership  Venture
*  Share Flotation
Brussels (Belgium)
Liverpool (UK)
Austria  East Midlands (UK)  *  Share Flotation
Czech Republic  Canada  Copenhagen (Denmark)  BAA (UK)
Greece  Germany  United Kingdom  Italy
EUROPE  AND NORTH  Hungary  Ireland  Fne  Vienna (Austria)
AMERICA  Romania  Israel  France  Zurich (Switzerland)  L  CyU
Russia  Netherlands  United States  London City (UK)
Sweden  Norway  *  BOT  *  MEBO
Spain  Birmingham (UK)  Belfast (UK)
*  BOOT
Toronto (T3) (Canada)
China Chong  Kona*  Joint Venture
Hong Kong  Kansai (Japan)
ASIA AND PACIFIC  Mlaysia  New Zealand  None  None




Maracaibo (Venezuela)  *  BOO
LATIN AMERICA  AND  Venezuela  Jamaica  None  Punta Cana (Dominican Rep.)




Angola  *  BOT
MIDDLE  EAST AND  Gabon  Nigeria  None  Istanbul (Turkey)  None
AFRICA  Kenya  South Africa
Saudi Arabia  *  Management Contract
Cameroon
FINANCING  FINANCING SOURCES  FINANCING SOURCES
*  Direct Government  Subsidies  *  Debt with Government Guarantess
*  Multilateral  Lending  *  Debt with Government  Guarantees  *  BOT, BTO, Leases
*  Bilateral  Lending  *  Municipal Bonds  *  Quasi-Equity Instruments
*  Equity Instruments
PUBLIC RISK  SHARED  RISK  PRIVATE RISK
21Table  2.4. Privatization  processes  in Latin  America  airports.
Country  Privatization  Plans
Privatization in progress
*  33 airports concessioned as a group to Argentina 2000.
*  Concession to 30 years with a 10 year possible extension.
ARGENTINA  . Bidding variable: annual payment.
*  Total investment: Aprox. US$ 2000 m.
*  Excluded: Ramp services, cargo and duty free shops.
*  ATC: Fuerza Aerea Argentina.
The three largest airports have been already privatized
*  El Alto, Viru Viru and Cochabamba concessioned to Airport Group International.
BOLIVIA  . Concession to 25 years, started March 1997.
*  Bidding variable: % of revenues - minimum: 14%.
*  A fund is created for maintenance and operation of 34 remaining airports.
*  Adaptation to FAA II rules and IATA level B.
BRAZIL  Strategy under consideration.
Privatization in progress
*  Concepci6n, Punta Arena, Temuco and Copiac6 to be concessioned in 1998.
*  Investment requirements: US$ 150 m.
CHILE  . Concession to 15 years.
*  Bidding variable: lowest charge per epax. Minimum revenues guaranteed.
*  Excluded: Aircraft fuel services.
*  ATC: DGAC.
Airports already concessioned: Iquique, Calama, La Serena, Puerto Montt, Santiago.
*  Bogota: El Dorado second runway concession to Ogden-Dragados-Conconcreto.
*  Cartagena: Awarded to Schiphol (30%) to 15 years. Fixed annual payment US$ 24.5
COLOMBIA  million.
*  Barranquilla: Awarded to AENA (50%) to  15 years. Fixed annual payment US$ 9
million.
*  Medellin  and Cali:  next in line.
COSTA  RICA  Privatization  in  progress.  OD  contract  for  San  Jose  International  Airport  is  being
COSTA  RICA  prepared.
ECUADOR  Privatization in progress. BOOT  contract for  new airport  development at  Quito and
Guayaquil. Required investment of US$ 700 m.
SALVADOR  Privatization  under  study.
GUATEMALA  Privatization under study for La Aurora and Tikal.
HONDURAS  Privatization under study for Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, La Ceiba and Roatan.
Privatization for Montego Bay-Sangster
JAMAICA  . BOO for passengers terminal.
*  49 years term.
*  The concessionaire will also operate actual terminal and airside activities.
PANAMA  Privatization under study.
PERU  Privatization plans for five national airports in the first half  of  1999 under a master
concession.
Privatization at initial stage.
MEXICO  . 58 airports to be concessioned grouped in three sets. Mexico D.F. excluded.
*  Southeast  Airport  Group  (Cancun)  awarded  to  the  consortium  formed  by
Copenhagen airport, GTM, Cintra and Tribasa.
REPUBLICA  Privatization  in progress. OD contract for Las Americas,  Puerto Plata, Samana  and
DOMINICANA  Barahona.
Concessions  plans:
URUGUAY  . Laguna del Sauce, Punta del Este.
*  Carrasco, Montevideo
VENEZUELA  Privatization under study for Simon Bolivar airport at Caracas.
Source: Anuario del Transporte 1997 (adapted).
22Table 2.5. Structure  of some European airports
~~  of 6wtterstdp  Market~~~~~~~*  Struactare  Pricing  PrlieipJIuade
:  . Airport  Publicly owned (AENA - the state-owned national airport  Handling:  Monopoly for third party  Operating  services:  Monopoly  Landing fee based on weight,  different passenger fees based on
.__::________  authority of Spain)  passenger handling  destination.  Yearly regulation,  no discrimination
ATlC  Publicly owned  by AENA  Monopoly  Based on aircraft type and dist. flown over own airspace
Publicly owned (Paris airports are owned and operated by  Handling: Self handling is allowed  Aeronautical  charges regulated by the state. Landing  fees are
Airport  Aeroports des Paris, which is owned by the state)  but not third party  Operatin  based on weight. Passengers  charge on departure
ATC  Publicly owned  Monopoly  Based on aircraft type and dist. flown over own airspace
Airport  Publicly owned except Dusseldorf and Berlin airports  Handling:  Monopoly/Oligopoly  Operating  services:  Monopoly  ake offand  landing fees are regulated by air transport
authorities.
ATC  Publicly owned  Monopoly  Based on aircraft type and dist. flown over own airspace
.n.  -.  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Charges  regulated by the state. Landing, terminal navigation  and
Airport :  . . Publicly  owned  (state),  municipality/mixed  and one private.  Handling:  Monopoly.  Except  for SAS  . Airport  O(Sweden  Civil  Aviation  Administration  runs all  major  airports and passengers,  not allowed  Operating serveices:  Monopoly security  charges.  Landing  fee  is based  on weight  (different  rates
(Sweden  Civi Aviation  Aministrationruns  all maor airports)and  passengrs, not  forointernational/domesticeticflighht)
ATC  Publicly  owned  Monopoly  Based  on aircraft  type and dist. flown  over own  airspace
- .a  A.  . . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Operating  services:  Monopoly Charges  for landing,  passenger  and aircraft  parking.  Noise charg
Airport  Mixed  ownership  between  a public  agency  and private  Handling:  Monopoly  (by  Swissair)  Ori  Sriss  aing  passen  and ai  t parking  charg
__________  __________________________________________  ~  ~~(by  Swissair)  (often combined with landing charge)
ATC  Publicly/Privately owned  Monopoly. Non-profit company.  Based on aircraft type and dist. flown over own airspace
Publicly owned  ~~~~~~~~~~Handling:  Competitive.  3 ground  Oprtn  evcs  oooyosubsidy  for international  airport,  regional  airport are
Airport  Publicly owned  Handling  C3perating  services: Monopoly  subsidized  in 60% of their operating  costs
ATC  Publicly  owned  Monopoly  Based on aircraft  type  and dist. flown  over own  airspace
Handling:  Monopoly  (in course  of  Operating servicea:  Monopol  Subsidies/Market.  Subsidies  mainly for operations  and
Airport  Publicly owned except Rome and Naples airports  liberalization)  Operating___services:__Monopoly__infrastructures__
ATC  Publicly  owned  Monopoly  Based on aircraft  type  and dist. flown  over own airspace
Airport  Publicly  owned  Handling:  3 ground  handling  Operating  services:  Monopoly .anding,  passenger,  parking,  air bridge and airport  fuel
__________________________________________________ operators  (local)  throughput  fees
ATC  Publicly  owned  Monopoly  Based  on aircraft  type and dist. flown  over  own airspace
Publicly owned  by ANA. Privatization  plans for ANA has  Handling: Passenger - Monopoly  Operating services: Monopoly  Aeronautical charges are set by government. Landing fee based
..  - Airport  been announced  (TAP). Freight - some competition  I(ANA)  on weight, not discount  or surcharge for noise
ATC  Publicly owned  onopoly  Based on aircraft type and dist. flown over on airspace
>, :  <-- :-  .>,  Most  of major  airports  are  prvately owned  by one company  lo  eratin se  Monopol  BAA  and Manchester:  RPI-X  constrained,  fixed  charge  per
Airport  (BAA), with Manchester and smaller airports owned by local  Handling: Competition  c  riy  ircraft  (including  surcharge of  50% for noise) and a per
lauthorities.  passenger  tax, with  surcharges  for parking
ATC  Publicly owned (plans have been announced to privatize)  Monopoly but, commercially  run  Based on aircraft type and dist. flown over own airspace
Source:  Viegas  and Femrndez,  (1997).
233.  -PRICE REGULATION
3.1.- Introduction
The trend toward privatizing the airport industry stems from a governments' view
that airports ought to be financially self-sufficient. However, some regulatory provisions
must be in place in order to control the substantial monopoly power that airports may
exploit. A clear instance is found at privatized British airports.  The Monopolies and Merger
Commission  (1996) reports that in certain cases airports in London have observed a course
of conduct that was against the public interest. As Forsyth (1984) points out, the main
question is determining  whether regulation limiting monopoly power could be a means for
improving airport  efficiency, and  in  particular, how  would  regulation influence the
equilibrium between productive and allocative efficiency? In turn, the answers to these
questions depend upon the features of the airport industry and the applicable regulatory
system.
First of all, in order to establish what airport activities could be exploited through
monopoly power, we  should clearly distinguish among them.  The classification that
separates aeronautical from non-aeronautical services is adequate for our purposes. 24 A
great variety of commercial  activities carried out at an airport, such as tax-free shops, retail
shopping, restaurants or hotel and bank services,  are considered non-aeronautical.  For these
types of activities, the introduction of competition would be feasible and desirable. Hence,
the unbundling  of activities could be useful for reducing the exertion of monopoly power to
a small set of aeronautical  services related to aircraft movements, such as the provision of
runways, aprons and taxiways. Therefore, if an airport is to be privatized, there will be a
clear need for establishing controlling rules that would allow for the regulation of private
sector  involvement. Regulation  could  take  several  forms.  The  most  important  is
competition for the right to serve the market (concessions or leasing), as well as fares or
profit controls. Nevertheless,  the most common regulation tool used for limiting monopoly
power is price regulation. Before we go onto describing the sort of mechanisms that might
permit the control of airport charges, we will point out some features related to airport
pricing structure.
An airport pricing system has to deal with several features, including costs covering,
congestion, environmental impacts, standard level of services, investment plans and cross-
subsidies. Not  only  is  the treatment of  such features complex, but  because of their
interdependence, it is very difficult to  conciliate all elements under a  common pricing
policy. For example, the financial goal of costs covering must be in accordance with the
necessity of investing in additional capacity. The pricing structure not only must ensure the
allocative efficiency of actual resources, but it must also reflect the need for new capacity
and  its  efficient assignment. Hence, the  optimal level  of  capacity (and  therefore of
congestion) at the airport must be determined. We should also add that the multi-product
nature of airport activities implies the presence of joint  costs that are common to  the
operation of several services. For instance, common areas at the terminal building allow the
24 See section 1.
24processing of passengers (handling),  while at the same time these areas are also utilized for
commercial  purposes. This makes it very difficult to determine the correct cost allocation
for different airport services. Furthermore,  the airport industry shows increasing returns to
scale  at  aeronautical  operations  due  to  capital  investment  indivisibilities.  These
characteristics  clearly influence the airport pricing structure. At this point, the important
question is; how might these peculiarities be incorporated into the pricing structure and
connected  to the design of a regulatory framework?
3.2.- Traditional  pricing policy
The recommendations  of international organizations (ICAO and IATA) for airport
costs covering include the application of average costs as the basic price. In addition, these
organizations sought to  establish a uniform fare structure for the whole industry. The
division of incurred costs between a number of processed traffic units provides a unitary
tariff. This procedure can be separated by distinguishing among different components of
total cost, in which case several fares for each service could be obtained. Given that all
users pay the same for utilization of same services,  most airlines support this mechanism  as
objective and fair. However, the reality is that different operators impose different costs,
and therefore they should face different charges. For example, an airline that operates at
peak periods imposes a cost (capacity cost) that is higher than others operating at off-peak
periods. Hence, there is  a need to  find a  way to  incorporate this  and  other industry
particularities into the actual fare system within the context of regulation. Otherwise, we
would have to consider other alternative  pricing mechanisms.
The similarity of fare structures found at the majority of airports rests on the fact
that most countries follow ICAO and IATA guidelines. Both organizations seek a uniform
pricing  system, recommending the utilization of aircraft weight as  the  basis for  the
estimation of applicable charges.  Table 3.1, where the pricing structure of several countries
is shown, verifies that such a structure basically corresponds to a landing fee, calculated
according  to aircraft  weight, plus a departure fee for passengers.
With the increasing involvement of the private sector into airport activities, the
uniformity of pricing structures around the world might break. Hence, privatized airports
could evolve toward a more efficient pricing system. For a  private firm, actual costs
covering, as well as those costs generated by future investments in additional capacity, are
of critical importance.  The actual  pricing structure,  upon which regulatory devices would be
applied, must  be  consistent with  additional capacity investment, which  would  allow
corresponding  costs to be covered. As the required time to recover the investment is quite
long, the regulator should permit price variations during the investment period with the aim
of adjusting costs and revenue generation. However, among the various problems that a
regulator might encounter, is the difficulty of establishing credible commitments, and the
need to develop a deep knowledge of the operations and opportunities that a privatized
airport might face.
25Table 3.1: Airport charges at selected airports (1998)
Ton.  Ton.  Ton.  Ton.
Rio de JanerNo  No  No  Yes
>  ~~~~  ~  ~~~~3  hrs.  hrs  2 hrs  3__s
i  |  ~~~~~~Passenger  Company  *  Company
|  ~~No|  No  No  No
_  1  (|igg  _  01i~~~~~~~1 
|  ~~~~~~~~~No  r  Yes  Yes  Yes
Nciise  No  No  Yes  No
g.1g11:  r  °~~~~~N  No  No  No
Source: Doganis  (1992) adapted and actualized.
1MTOW: Maximum  take off weight.
2MAW: MaxiTnum aircraft weight.
*It is not an airport charge.  It is collected at ticketing  point as Government  levy.
The selection of the initial price structure will be the basis for the application of the
regulatory mechanism. It should be an adequate guideline for future investment and also
ensure an efficient allocation of resources. Economic theory states that if the price is
established  according  to  the  service  marginal  cost,  an  efficient  allocation  of  resources
amnong  users would be obtained. The paid fare would reflect the true service value, with
those not willing to pay not being served. However, those airports that generally operate
below available capacity present a very small marginal cost, not being able to produce
enough revenues for the covering of total costs. In the airport industry, a great deal of costs
are sunk, or there are historical costs that do not conformn  to the service marginal cost.
Therefore, the  strict application of a  charging policy that  follows the  marginal cost
criterion, would inevitably lead to  financial losses for those  airports operating below
available capacity.
26Given that price-demand elasticity of airport services is lower than one,"  there
might be another possibility for the generation  of extra revenues through the application of
an ad-hoc rule known as Ramsey pricing. This policy suggests that when the marginal cost
rule does not allow enough revenue generation  to cover costs, it would be more efficient to
charge users according to their willingness to pay. Costs covering would then be ensured
without getting far away from the efficient allocation principle. Hence, this would be a
means for deficit reduction that avoids the utilization of cross-subsidies. Nevertheless,
airport monopoly  power would be substantially  exploited.
3.3.- The British Airports: price regulation  through an RPI - X formula
The British Airport Authority (BAA) today enjoys a considerable  degree of market
power. The majority of air traffic arriving or departing the United Kingdom goes through
two  of  the  most  important BAA  airports, Heathrow  and  Gatwick. The  chance  for
competition from other airports in the UK and the European continent, such as Paris or
Amsterdam, is  remote. The possible appearance of  a  competitor would be  frustrated
through an occasional and adequate fare cut at London airports. Hence, monopoly power
exerted by BAA airports is real, and may have clear repercussions upon service users and
society as a whole.
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of the United Kingdom is responsible for the
provision of air traffic control services and the regulation of safety and economic aspects at
airports in the country. Among its objectives as an airport regulator are the protection of
consumers interests, the promotion of economic  efficiency, the financial viability of airport
services and the encouragement of additional capacity investments in order to meet future
air transport  demand growth. However, the most known function of the CAA relates to the
establishment  of a maximum level of charges for large airports. The Airports Act (1986)
does not specify anything regarding the regulation of BAA's commercial activities. The
only charges subject to regulation are the landing, passengers and aircraft parking fees.
Profits generated by commercial activities are usually utilized as compensation for less
regulated aeronautical fares. There is, therefore, a cross subsidy for aeronautical services
with revenues arising from commercial  activities. Such a mechanism is known as the single
till principle. Obviously, the application of this principle leaves aeronautical  service prices
below provision costs, which generally represents  a problem when it is a congested airport.
Consequently,  the application of this method leads to economic inefficiency.  Nevertheless,
the abandonment of it would imply that aeronautical service charges should reflect the
higher provision costs, which would lead to  airports increasing their profits since they
would no longer need to cross subsidize and hence, they could make bigger profits at non-
regulated commercial activities. In turn, under the single till principle, air carriers would
also enjoy a part of airport commercial revenues through cross subsidizing by keeping
reasonable aeronautical  charges. It also ensures that the private airport operator would not
obtain excessively high profits. This is the rationale behind the behavior of the British
airports regulatory authority. Of course, the application of the principle does not  help
airport congestion  problems.
25 See section  1.
27Pricing regulation takes the forn  of a price-cap  applied to revenues deriving from
airport charges per passenger, also called revenue yield (see Box 3.1). Price caps regulation
according to the RPI-X formula have been a key element in the field of regulatory reform in
Great Britain. Approximately 50 firms in  the United Kingdom are under this  sort of
regulation. This  system encompasses a  pricing structure that  is  subject  to  specified
maximum fare increases, expressed in  terms of  percentages that  can not  exceed the
difference  between the Retail Price Index and a given factor "X". This index is preferred to
an industry specific one because it can not be manipulated by the regulated firm. A term
period is established,  usually five years, after which prices and limits are revised. Regarding
the "X" factor, as this is exogenous  to the firm, it may vary and be different for each year of
the regulatory period.
BOX 3.1. The RPI-X formula for BAA airports
28It should  be pointed out that processed passengers are not the only output at airports,
consequently,  aircraft  that carry cargo and mail are not considered  by this type of regulatory
system (revenue  yield). An alternative  for the application of regulation  is given by the tariff
basket  approach, according to which the regulatory mechanism is applied upon a weighted
average of each component of the fare structure. Such an approach takes into account the
different airport outputs since it weighs each element of the fare structure by its generated
revenue. However, the British Civil Aviation Authority recommends the utilization of the
approach based on passengers revenue. There is  not yet any evidence pointing to the
existence  of serious  problems relating to the application  of this method.
The application of a price-cup formula may also allow part of the costs to be passed
directly  to users. For instance, at BAA London airports and at Manchester  airport, a passing
through of 95% of the additional security costs imposed by the Ministry of Transport is
permitted with a one year lag period. The regulator may opt for allowing a high price in
order to compensate for the risk of losses, or it may reduce the period of regulation as a
means for minimizing risk. This last alternative  aims to protect airports against unexpected
cost changes.
At  Table 3.2  an  example of  the  application of  the  price-cup formula at  the
Manchester  airport for a five year period is shown.
Table 3.2. Application of a price-cup  at Manchester  airport (93/94 to 97/98)
-X  3  .z --'  '  ' ' '  '  M  '  33.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0
RPI(%,  2g@;  3-;  3  - - 32  ;0;;;  s1.8  2.2  3.9  2.1  3.5
W,;,_  ,  ............  .- 1.2  -0.8  0.9  -0.9  0.5
7.675  7.614  7.683  7.614  7.652
:  :  i  ->  4  !  - 0.172  0.173
,  . a i  +  :  S  0.265  0.379  0.911
.---- ibl[  - tV0fl*  ~  7.675  7.614  7.948  8.165  8.736*
17.en~iteper  obWaaed  -{ :  7435  7.278  7.136  7.192  7.505*
.,  !:rww;,-0.240  -0.336  -0.812  -0.973  -1.231*
-vwloise  _  __lli~u~>  3.1  4.8  12.0  14.2  19.0
Source:  Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  (1997).
* Estimated values.
29The formula is adjusted to allow for 95% of security costs to be passed on to users.
There is also a  correction factor based on passenger traffic forecasts that permits the
adjustment of forecasting errors that might give rise to differences between allowable and
truly obtained revenues. A detailed explanation of the calculations and terms utilized to
construct Table 3.2 is given in Box 3.2.
When limits on prices are imposed, there is the possibility that profitability could be
increased at the expense of quality of service. For instance, an airport may reduce costs by
not cleaning the terminal building regularly or by allowing congestion and delays. Hence,
when prices are regulated through a  price-cup there is always the need for monitoring
quality by establishing reasonable standards. This was a  crucial element when airlines
evaluated the quality of  service at BAA  airports. Carriers argued that  an  absence of
standards might provide an incentive for BAA to increase profits through a deterioration of
service quality.
A regulator also has to consider  that airports may try to cross subsidize aeronautical
activities when subject to regulation. The presence of joint costs represents a temptation to
allocate a great part of those to  the regulated activity, or monopolistic prices may be
charged for commercial unregulated  services, for which price controlling is more difficult.
In this sense, BAA has argued  that regulated aeronautical  fares were quite low as a result of
the strict control, making cross subsidization from commercial services necessary. The
main consequence of this procedure was the diversification of services provided and the
emphasis  on commercial  activities.
Another element to be taken into account is that an efficient fare structure requires
great flexibility in its application due to the changing nature of airport service demand.
According  to BAA, price controlling clearly affected the efficiency of their services. BAA
also  asserted that  severe regulation may result in  financial difficulties for  the airport
operator,  bringing unforeseeable  consequences in regard to profits.
Finally, according to the Civil Aviation Authority, the main benefit derived from regulation
was that it obliged airports to keep costs low. In other words, airports were minimizing
costs in order to get higher profits. Other important conclusions  were: (i) the regulator must
clearly know what its goals and responsibilities are; and (ii) the regulator must have direct
access to all the information  needed, including confidential  material, in order to carry out its
work properly.
30Box 3.2. Details of application of the price-cup at Manchester airport
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As we have pointed out above, there are certain aspects of the airport industry that
are very difficult to incorporate into the regulatory structure. Nevertheless, if regulation
through an RPI-X formula is to be efficiently applied, such elements ought to be taken into
account. Factors that may cause larger troubles when regulating airport charges are, among
others, congestion, externalities such as noise, 27 investment indivisibilities and  service
quality. Below we consider each of these aspects individually.
3.4.  1.- Congestion
Costs that arise when processing an additional passenger or aircraft at an airport that
operates below available capacity at any time are close to zero. Under these conditions,
additional passenger or aircraft charges should be established according to the airport short
run marginal cost. However,  if demand increases,  giving rise to a large traffic concentration
at peak hours, the corresponding marginal cost would be  much higher than the  one
applicable at off-peak periods. Hence, in such a case there would be a reason for price
discrimination, specifically, the charged price for peak periods could be much higher than
the one applied at off-peak intervals. If investment aims to increase capacity, fares should
also incorporate this fact. In summary, an optimal fare structure that allows congestion
problems to be considered needs to be quite flexible. However, if price controls take the
form of price cups, this implies rigidities that do not permit changes in prices over time.
Hence, in practice, such a regulatory mechanism limits the utilization of prices as a tool to
manage the problem of congested airports.
There are two important aspects related to congestion at airports: (i)  determining
optimal capacity and (ii) its efficient allocation. Regarding the former, the existence of a
price-cup implies that the airport has no incentive for optimizing available capacity given
that it faces a fixed fare structure for which revenues increase only if traffic flow also
increases. Hence, this type of price regulation breaks the link between congestion  reduction
and revenue generation.  In other words, the airport gets no gains from reducing congestion.
A possible solution to this problem may come through the incorporation  of congestion  costs
into the price regulatory formula.  Nevertheless, finding an adequate indicator of congestion
is not an easy task, and even more difficult, would be the inclusion of the variable in the
price-cup. An alternative way around the problem could be provided by a regulator that
establishes the optimal level of capacity through a  cost-benefit analysis that compares
congestion costs against  benefits arising from the availability  of larger capacity.
Once optimal capacity has  been determined, it  has to  be  efficiently allocated.
Usually, this consists of determining a price that equilibrates market supply and demand.
Those airports with traffic  volumes exceeding capacity at certain times  should apply
26 See Forsyth (1997).
27 See section 1.
32different charges at peak and off-peak  periods. Price discrimination is justified by the high
level of traffic verified at peak periods. If the level is high enough, this may give rise to the
need for additional capacity investments. However, the conflict mentioned above remains.
Price-cups regulation limits such a possibility since its goal is to keep fares low, which is
incompatible with peak pricing as a peak fare would be necessarily higher in order to
allocate capacity  more efficiently.
A possible way to reconcile the application of the price cup regulatory formula  with
an efficient allocation of capacity at congested airports consists of applying,  jointly with the
price formula, a mechanism for the allocation of slots and/or establishing a slots market.
For instance, available capacity as determined  by the regulator could be allocated through a
public auction, after which resale would be permitted. The main problem caused by this
procedure is determining who is going to obtain rents arising from sales. If the regulator
allows the airport to take the money in, then it would have an incentive for keeping capacity
scarce and prices high. However, this  experience has been implemented at airports in
London and it seems to have worked relatively well.
3.4.2.- Extemalities
Noise is one of the most important negative extemalities generated at airports. As
aircraft noise affects a large number of people, there is a need for the internalization and
incorporation of its effects as part of total airport costs. In order to proceed, the extemal
marginal costs must  by  estimated, followed by  the establishment of a  fare structure.
However, the  main question is  how to  consider the  extemal effects jointly  with  the
regulatory framework.  In this sense, there are two main problems. First, how to incorporate
noise control devices, for instance, through a special fare mitigating excess noise into the
regulatory formula, and secondly, how to reconcile permissible noise levels and airport
capacity.
In general there are three altematives to regulate noise level that are consistent with
the RPI-X formula: (i) incorporation of a noise index into the formula, (ii) charging a
special fare paid by the airport or its users and, (iii) establishing quantitative limits. The
idea behind the first procedure is that it would allow airports to charge higher fares the
lower the level of noise, in a way that airlines would be penalized if they succeed in
reducing its noise. Hence, airlines would have the incentive to collude and operate in the
opposite direction. The second entails airports being penalized according to  the noise
generated by its customers. However, given that it is not the airport itself that generates
noise, but its users, the airport should be in the position to pass through such costs to the
users.  Altematively,  air  transport  carriers  could  be  charged  directly.  Finally,  the
establishment of quantitative limits, such as restrictions on certain types of airplanes or
banning  air traffic operations for a given period of the day, are instances of solutions that fit
into the third altemative. These may be complemented  by a charge aimed at reducing noise
at peak hours. For example, night restrictions might be complemented  by another charge
that would limit noise during the day. Such a combination can be found at Sidney airport,
for which a noise charge is combined  with the application of quantitative  limits.
33Capacity may be augmented  by choosing different aircraft approach routes, which
would also lead to increases in noise levels. This trade off could be studied through a cost
benefit analysis. The regulator would have to get information regarding the costs of noise
on different routes, and then compare them with the benefits arising from the availability  of
additional capacity. The regulator would then be in the position to select the most efficient
combination.  However,  this would be possible only if it is also able to control other aspects,
including environmental  impacts, at airports.
3.4.3.- Quality of service
Quality of  service is  an  important aspect that  must  be  controlled when price
regulation  is implemented.  An airport that faces a regulated price will try to reduce its costs
in order to get a higher profit margin. Hence, elements related to quality of service must be
closely supervised. There are four mechanisms that allow for the control of quality. First,
the regulatory agency might ask the airport to publish certain quality standards. Second, a
quality index might be incorporated  inside the RPI-X formula.  A third option would consist
in establishing compensation  for users of poor quality services. Finally, a fourth possibility
would be given by the fixing of minimum quality standards. Airports that do not comply
would be fined or subject to a revision of regulatory conditions.
Usually ad hoc methods are applied for controlling quality. For instance, in the
telecommunication industry  of  Great  Britain  and  Australia,  the  regulator  collects
information  through quality indexes. Those airports with quality indicators below required
levels would be subject to regulatory pressure. However, in regard to airports, development
of good quality indicators is not an easy task. Nevertheless,  within the context of regulation,
it is crucial to take steps for evaluating service quality and hence, ensure that these do not
deteriorate.  Fixing minimum quality standards and enforcing compliance  might be the most
effective  means, since it implicates airports in the attainment of quality aims. However, air
carriers, as the main airport users, also have a large role in airport quality, as frequently,
services are jointly provided by the airport and the air carrier. Concessionaires of airport
services,  such as passenger and luggage handling, are in many cases the airlines themselves
or other outside companies. Consequently,  the attainment of service standards and quality
controls  must be the responsibility  of both the airports  and the main operators.
Another aspect related to quality has to do with the existence of enough airport
capacity to offer services at an acceptable level of quality. As has already been mentioned,
there is  lack of  incentive to  invest in new capacity at those airports subject to  price
regulation. Uncertainty regarding additional capacity costs coverage implies that certain
adjustments should be allowed in order to charge higher prices when investment takes
place. However, this means that the regulator must provide ad hoc solutions and therefore,
move away from the simplicity  of the single application of a price cup.
343.4.4.- Investment plans
The provision of airport infrastructure is subject to  the existence of significant
indivisibilities, meaning  that  capacity can  be  augmented only  by  adding large  and
indivisible  units. In this context, an important element is given by the relationship between
airport charges and the need to amplify capacity. This leads to another problem for the
regulatory framework.
When an airport disposes of excess capacity, the optimum price is given by the short
run marginal cost. If demand increases, the use of capacity would need to be rationalized
through a significant price increase, which could be equal to the long run marginal cost.
This would be the efficient way to proceed when capacity is scarce. In other words, users
demanding more capacity might pay the marginal cost of obtaining it. Nevertheless, once
additional capacity investments have been carried out, and considering that indivisibilities
would again give rise to excess capacity, the efficient use of resources would indicate a
need to charge lower fares. Hence, an efficient price system would lead to  low revenue
levels most of the time. This aspect of capacity is troublesome for the design of an RPI-X
formula, since this system of regulation imposes rigidities that do not allow necessary
fluctuations  in order to efficiently charge.  Nor does it permit the airport to break even.
It is important to point out that privatized airports forecast future investments by
taking into account the actual price system upon which regulation is applied. Therefore,
such a price system has to be consistent with coverage of additional investment  costs. There
is a need to establish a regulatory system that would permit private airport operators to
cover actual costs, as well as those generated  by future investments. The British experience
in regulation was such that the regulator was unable to design a regulatory mechanism  that
allowed investment decisions to rest entirely in the hands of private concessionaires. The
regulator had  to  intervene in  order to  evaluate the  impact of  price  regulation upon
investment  plans. In this sense, the regulator adopted a managerial  role.
3.5.- Design of the regulatory mechanism
The British experience  in regulation indicates  that price cup regulation may impose
certain risks upon the regulated firm, making profits more volatile. This  implies that
regulated prices have to be frequently revised. Therefore, the regulator can not establish a
unique limit that would be binding over a substantial period of time, and consequently,  the
main advantage of this regulatory procedure can not be properly exploited. Apart from
congestion and externality problems, there are also complications relating to the implicit
incentives  to degrade the quality of services provided in order to increase profit margins.
Regulatory prospects are further complicated by the lack of incentives to invest in new
capacity.
In the United Kingdom, the regulator has frequently had to intervene in order to
compensate for the effects of the price cup formula. For example, adjustments in capital
expenditures are often needed, or additional security costs need to be passed through to
users. Other adjustments due to inaccurate traffic forecasts, which affect factor X, are also
common. If traffic increases are markedly above predicted levels, it might be necessary  to
35provide  investment expenditures  incrementally in  order  to  avoid  likely  congestion
problems. This would have clear repercussions  upon financial airport results. In other word,
the regulator is often compelled  to apply an ad hoc regulatory price mechanism.
An ad hoc regulatory mechanism  might partially allow for a solution to the troubles
that arise from the pure application of a price cup. In this sense, Forsyth (1997) proposes to
use a mixed system, designed in such a way that would combine regulation through the
RPI-X formula with the rate of return. Fares would be established with reference to the
price cup formula and real airport costs. Weights given to each of these elements would
depend upon the importance of different inefficiency sources. For example, if quality is a
serious problem, more emphasis would have to be put on airport costs. Airports would be
allowed to recover a great deal of the costs incurred by the provision of better service
quality. This mixed rule would open up the possibility of adjusting in an ad hoc manner
airport gains or losses. Furthermore, it would soften the critical aspects that arise when
establishing an initial price upon which the regulatory mechanism  would be applied.
Hence, the application of such a mixed regulatory system to the airport industry
might be desirable. However, this would mean a more active role for the regulator, as it
would not be possible to simply establish price regulation,  while leaving the airport itself to
make the rest of the decisions. The regulator would need to establish the necessary  capacity
at congested airports and, perhaps, the creation of a slot market. It should also estimate
noise  costs, establish charges for internalization of such  effects, and  try to  reconcile
allowable  noise levels with airport capacity. Finally, as a result of the importance  of quality
related aspects and the presence of externalities at airports, the regulator would have to
decide directly  upon industry investment  plans.
364.  - QUALITYREGULA  TION IN THE  AIRPORT INDUSTRY
4.1.- The need for regulation
The main reason for regulating quality is market failure. Consumers are imperfectly
informed about the quality of products at the time of purchase, and are therefore unable to
distinguish a bad quality provider from a good quality one. In general, regulation is needed
in order to  overcome such informational asymmetry. Nevertheless, the quality outcome
may differ with the type of market and the temporal dimension. In competitive markets,
firms that produce low quality products and sell them at high quality prices will acquire a
bad  reputation and  will be  excluded from the  market  (Klein and  Leffler,  1981). In
monopolistic situations, the quality of the product is always lower than under a perfect
information setting. Imperfect information causes quality deterioration (Shapiro, 1982).
Regulators, however, face similar asymmetric information problems regarding product
quality.
As we have seen in section 3, privatized airports are usually subject to some sort of
pricing regulatory mechanism. Less common is quality regulation, in spite of the likely
exploitation of monopoly power in  some airport operations. For instance, the British
Airports Authority (BAA), although subject to price-capping, 28 does not have to comply
with a level of quality specified by the regulator. Rather, BAA itself keeps track of their
quality records by periodically carrying out quality survey monitoring. It seems that being
subject to Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) scrutiny acts as a sufficient incentive to keep
high quality standards without any specific regulatory provision. Nevertheless, BAA and
the airlines actually agree upon the level of service to be provided. Areas such as check-in,
security queues, jetty availability, stand availability and cleaning,  project development,  and
departure and transfer baggage, are usually the main matters under discussion. Performance
measures, services standards and compensation payments in case of non-fulfillment, are
included in the final service level agreement.
4.2.- Monitoring  quality: the case of BAA self-regulation
In order to evaluate quality performance at airports it is necessary to distinguish
between the different recipients of airport services and also between the various ways of
assessing quality. The main airport customers are the airlines, which in turn depend upon
paying passengers. For this reason, any performance  measure standards should distinguish
between services directly provided to passengers and those intended for airlines. At the
same time, there are two main approaches for the assessment of quality. First, there is a
subjective approach that bases its analysis on quality surveys that  capture the  quality
perceptions of passengers and airlines. On the other hand, there are also more objective
approaches involving the measurement of performance against measurable standards (see
Table 4.1).
28 Price-caps  might induce quality costs cutting, as operators choose to reduce quality and hence costs, rather
than  increase  efficiency.
37Table 4.1. Elements  for quality assessment at airports
Passengers  |  Airlines  |  Others
Subjective approach:  Quality surveys monitoring
assessment  Objective  approach:  Establishment  of standards and
measurement  of performance
4.2.1.- Services  to passengers
As  mentioned above, BAA  controls the level  of quality  in passenger services
through  quality  survey monitoring. This  constitutes an  application of  the  subjective
approach. The survey measures passengers' perception of the  service they receive in
departures, arrivals and retail areas. Over 250,000 passengers are interviewed each year.
The interview takes 8 to 12 minutes, and passengers are asked to assess services on a five-
point scale from "extremely poor"(1) through "average"(3)  to "excellent"(5). At Heathrow,
Gatwick and Stansted, information has been collected throughout a  six-year period on
customers perception of twelve basic aspects of services in the departures area, and seven
basic aspects of services in the arrivals area. Departing passengers are interviewed  as they
enter the gateroom, and arriving passengers as they exit the terminal. In a similar way,
perceptions about various aspects of service and value for money provided by retail outlets,
car parks and restaurants,  are also collected.
Scores for BAA airports are presented at Tables 4.2 and 4.3. However, these are
results only for those areas that are common to all three airports. Each table shows the
constituent factors for each airport ranked according to  the quality survey monitoring.
Results show that, on average, passengers perceive most areas to be at least "average."
Many areas are ranked between "good" and  "excellent," and  no  area  is  assessed as
"extremdly poor."  Overall, Stansted scores consistently well, and  Gatwick still scores
slightly better than Heathrow, although Heathrow has  shown more improvement than
Gatwick since 1991.
In addition to recording subjective measures about passengers' perceptions, various
performance standards have also been established by BAA .An example of check-in queue
targets is presented at Table 4.4.
38Table 4.2. Quality survey monitoring scores. Departure and arrival areas at selected
BAA airports. 1995/96
HEATROW  AI~WCK1STANTI
-Secury queue  4.1  4.2  4.4
Telephones  4.0  4.0  4.1
Chec¢-4n  .~zeue  4.0  4.0  4.3
4.0  4.1  4.5
^  -t  information  - -3.9  4.0  4.0
Tolets  - ---  -3.9  4.0  4.4
Tro1l~  ,,  . _3.9  3.9  4.2
id,seating---~-  Xl  3.7  3.9  4.2
Amiou--:  - -;s  3.7  3.7  4.0
Ched&in crowdi  3.6  3.8  4.1
Laudaide  seating  3.5  3.8  4.1
flAparttirlounge crowdingi  3.5  3.8  4.3
Ave--g-  ---  - -3.82  3.93  4.22
4.2  4.3  4.5
Di:  - 4.0  4.0  4.1
Trolleys  3.9  3.8  4.2
Tdelhnes-0  i  --  -3.9  4.0  4.2
Baggage  reclaimqueue  3.8  3.9  4.0
Ti&ilets  0  - ;3.8  3.9  4.4
C  kou crowding  3.5  3.8  4.3
Aw-.:-e  -i ;-;--  .-. 3.87  3.96  4.24
Note: A score I is "extremely poor", 2 is "poor", 3 is "average", 4 is "good" and 5 is  "excellent".
Source:  Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  (1996).
39Table 4.3. Quality survey monitoring scores. Retail value for money areas at selected
BAA airports. 1995/96
Othe-r  Th  - 1g 4  tering  3.4  3.8  3.8
:  ~~~3.61  3.7  3X71
1, P  3.4  3.5  3.5
_ft~uxc  Z3.3  3.5  3.4
Longtermperking  3.3  3.6  3.4
$xei|npjrkh  g  2.7  3.1  3.5
ArnWSl:,  ........  igagI  leW  w  3.4  3.61  3.63
Note: A score I is "extremely poor', 2 is "poor", 3 is "average", 4 is "good" and 5 is "excellent".
Source:  Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  (1996).
Table 4.4. BAA check-in queue targets
Heathrow  Gatwick  Stansted  Gatwick
Scheduled  Charter
20  20  15  Short-haul  Long-haul  18
10  18
Services provided to  passengers may  sometimes be  perceived as  inadequate.
Airports usually devise a mechanism for tending to passenger complaints. However, the
sensitivity of airport authorities  to such complaints  is dependent on the degree of monopoly
power and regulatory provisions. 29
Complaints and  suggestions from passengers may arrive in  a  variety of forms:
comment cards, letters, telephone calls, e-mail or in person. The processing and treatment
of those may be subject to regulation. Usually a  customer services department handles
complaints,  but the regulator may be the ultimate arbitrator.  In addition, there may be fixed
targets regarding prompt responses.
29 Here monopoly  power refers to the existence of competing airports.
404.2.2.- Services  to airlines
Service directly provided to airlines also has to be taken into account in order to
reach a complete quality assessment. Although BAA is not subject to quality standards,
some airlines have already requested the Monopolies and Mergers Commission  to establish
standards regarding the availability of key operational equipment such as baggage belts,
jetties, stands, moving walkways  and lifts.
In spite of a  lack of quality regulation, BAA makes direct measurements of its
service delivery by recording objective data on the availability  of critical equipment.  Table
4.5 shows the 24 hour availability  data for passenger-sensitive equipment from April 1995
to March 1996. Other performance  indicators developed by BAA are: number of faults per
unit (as a measure of the effectiveness  of preventive maintenance),  and time to site and time
to repair (as measures of reactive maintenance).  A target of repairing 95% of faults within
four hours was set. Table 4.6. shows average fault repair time for passenger sensitive
equipment.  Other aspects considered are: percentage of passengers boarding /disembarking
via jetty, coach or steps (see Table 4.7), planned and unplanned stand outage (in terms of
hours per month) and maximum  baggage handling delivery times (see Table 4.8).
Table 4.5. Percentage  availability of critical equipment  at selected BAA airports. April
1995 to March 1996
97.8  99.2  99.0  99.1  98.9
98.8  99.5  99.3  n.a.  99.3
98.4  99.4  98.7  98.5  99.3
.~  98.6  99.5  99.4  99.7  99.8
98.1  99.4  98.5  99.2  99.5
97.5  99.2  97.9  98.8  99.2
99.4  99.4  99.5  n.a,.  99.9
n.a.: Not available.
Source: Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  (1996).
41Table 4.6. Average fault repair times for critical equipment (hours) at selected BAA
airports.  April 1995 to March 1996
T111  M  O  1.52  3.18  2.31  1.92  1.79
g  §  2  !  !  :  0.14  2.35  1.31  n.a.  3.24
M0111  g  1  o.55  4.53  4.24  4.45  1.82
0.63  3.75  0.83  0.68  1.09
0.92  2.04  1.25  1.49  1.29
1.60  1.97  6.27  1.57  1.81
M  gg  |  0.12  1.64  0.46  n.a.  0.31
n.a.: Not available.
Source:  Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  (1996).
Table 4.7. Average levels of pier service at selected BAA airports. 1995/96
.ncldi  g  ChannelIsandsandIArrival  87  9  4
_J_  ~~~~~~~Departure  8  974
ial  g  S  X  ......  . Arrival  79  1  7  4
Departure  8C1  15  4
4Departure  92  2 
&;l  jl;  11  |Arrival  8  9  7  4
Departure  90  4  6
|  Arrival  94  3  3
_  t  ~~Departure  93  4  3
|Departure  7  75  2  1 |4
=  |  ~~~~~~~Arrival  |  83  31  1  4
|  ~~~~~~~~Departure  |  83  1  31  14
*Including  Ihne  Islands  and  Ireland.
Source: Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  (I1996).
42Table 4.8. Standards for maximum baggage delivery times at selected BAA airports
(minutes)
Tem--I'  - -::- - 16-20  30-34
=~~~  ~  ~~~  21  25
Tez-  -:  . - -24-28  49-53




Source:  Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  (1996).
Airlines may feel disappointed regarding airport services. Hence a mechanism to
register their complaints  also has to be in place. This aspect will have to be considered  by a
regulator concerned about the exploitation of monopoly power. For instance, in the case of
BAA, it is the Civil Aviation Authority which is responsible for addressing complaints.
This procedure applies not only to airlines but to  other agents such as tour-operators or
concessionaires as  well.  Other airports that  might  feel  damaged by  anti-competitive
practices may also  refer to  such authorities or  even to  the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission.
Many of the most crucial aspects of airport operations are not always the direct
responsibility of the airport authority. Aircraft landings and take-off punctuality  would also
be  determined by  visual and approach air traffic  services. So in  order to  keep with
published  time tables both the airport authority and the Air Traffic Control must be closely
coordinated,  particularly  when they belong to different organizational  bodies.
All the variables mentioned above, even in terms of scores or standards, constitute
instances of possible regulatory quality targets. Standards might be applied either when a
full  divestiture has  been  applied  or  when  a  concession contract  is  intended.  The
convenience of intervening in order to fix quality levels should be studied by the regulator.
A  scrutiny mechanism and  agreements with air transport carriers regarding prices and
corresponding  quality levels might be adequate in order to ensure good quality standards.
434.3.- Regulation  of safety and externalities
Airport safety would also play an important  role in determining quality. Its objective
is to  ensure that passengers will have a normal waiting time and flight, and that the
possibilities of suffering a terrorist or criminal attack are minimal. The procedures required
to comply with safety standards impose some costs on passengers and airlines. Different
components  of the airport security system are shown at Table 4.9.
Security queues are considered an important determinant of airport quality. BAA
reports that among the three airports mentioned above, 90% of passengers waited less than
five minutes and 95%, less than 10 minutes. Airlines have suggested that a  maximum
waiting period of five minutes at London airports for a security search would be desirable.
In economic  jargon, externalities are considered a market failure, hence wherever
they appear intervention is  regarded as necessary. The main negative externalities at
airports are noise,  congestion and pollution. 30 Traditionally, airport operators or  even
corresponding  regulators, have left externalities aside, and only recently have they started
worrying about their environmental impact. Today, it is common to find airports where
night operations have been banned or restricted to less noisy aircraft's. Higher fares for
noisier planes is another technique that aims to reduce the social cost of noise. Peak-pricing
is also spreading  as a practice for relieving  congestion. Air pollution, however, has not been
given much importance.
The  increasing  sensitivity toward  environmental concerns has  led  to  special
treatment  for  externalities  in  most  infrastructure  project  contracts.  Usually  an
environmental impact  study  is  required  as  a  pre-requisite for  airport  infrastructure
construction.  Such a study should also consider  the monitoring of possible negative impacts
during  the  operation phase.  In  general, the  environmental impact study  will  reflect
environmental  law.
4.4.- Regulation  of investment  obligations
As  was shown in  section 2, the possibilities for private  sector participation in
airports are numerous. However, if involvement  in the activity does not comprise long term
objectives such as maintenance of facilities and future investments, airports would end up
obsolete and highly deteriorated. This could be the case when a concession contract does
not consider investment obligations. Fortunately, this is not often the case in most airport
infrastructure  concession contracts.
On the contrary, investment plans are usually an essential part of the contract. For
instance, the concession contract that was recently prepared for the operation of Argentine
airports required the operator to present a detailed investment plan. The concessionaire is
obliged to invest a minimum amount of something more than US$2 billion, in addition to
30 See section  1.
44the rest of the planned investments. Such a plan has to be clearly stated, specifying in
physical and monetary terms, the works that will be carried out  during the concession
period. These works include a new airport for Buenos  Aires.
BAA also has its investment plans subject to CAA scrutiny. Projected investments
are presented  periodically, and the regulator expects these to be broadly in line with reality.
Additionally,  BAA is required to consult airlines on future development  plans.
Table 4.9. Components  of the airport security system
Screening passengers, body  search,  screening
Pre-departure gate screening  airport  and airline personnel,  X-ray inspection  of
carry-on  luggage.
Parked aircraft control  Screening airport and  airline personnel, alarm
systems  for parked  aircraft,  aircraft  security  survey.
Screening  airport  and  airline  personnel,  alarm
Aircraft movement  systems for  parked aircraft's, aircraft security
survey.
Crew screening  Background  checks,  training,  pre-departure
screening.
Surveillance of jetway access, ramp doors, alarm
Ramp security  systems, fire sensors and  protection, screening
personnel.
Perimeter  security  Posting,  fencing,  gates and other opening, lights
placement and protection.
Surveillance of jetway access, ramp doors, alarm
Terminal security  systems, fire sensors and protection, screening
personnel.
Passenger  screening  Visual, body searching,  X-ray inspection, location.
Passenger  flow  control  Flow holding, camera surveillance, pre-departure Passenger flow control  screening.
X-ray  inspection,  carry-on  luggage  screening,
Baggage and cargo screening  luggage surveillance  from  drop  off  to  loading,
personnel screening.
Telephone and radio communications, emergency
Intelligence  and communications  power, bomb threat contingency plans, evacuation
plans.
Source: Fleming and Ghobrial (1993)
455.- PERFORANCE  INDICATORS  IN THE  AIRPORTINDUSTRY
5.1.- Introduction
The privatization  of a firm leads to an increase in productive efficiency, since in the
absence of regulation, the firm pursues profit maximization. However, if the firm exerts
monopoly power, it is  possible that allocative efficiency is reduced. In  such a  case,
regulation  could be a means for limiting market power, although regulation might affect the
economic efficiency as  well. The  impact would  depend upon  the  regulatory system
implemented. In  the airport  industry, the most  common form  of  regulation is  price
intervention.  If charges are established independent of profits, productive efficiency would
be feasible, although  usually prices are fixed in such a way that firm profits would be under
control. Price  controls permit  an  improvement in  allocative efficiency by  reducing
monopoly power. However, it could also reduce productive efficiency (Forsyth, 1997).
Hence, regulation  may affect the economic efficiency of the airport industry. It is therefore
necessary  to develop  performance  indicators that permit control of airport activities liable to
be affected  by regulation.
The evaluation of airport efficiency is not  a trouble-free task. The geographic,
economic, political and  social features of the  airport region complicate any  industry
efficiency  assessment. Doganis (1992) points out that evaluations  tend to be based on profit
margin analysis. Obviously, this criterion is inadequate since it does not incorporate any
information  concerning the resources that go into obtaining such a margin. Therefore, it is
essential to establish indicators aimed at assessing the effectiveness of resource utilization,
which at the same time, may serve as control tools for airport managers seeking to identify
those areas with problems requiring prompt corrective measures. Indicators would also be
of great help for governments concerned with regulation. For example, indicators could be
used to ensure that national resources are being used in the most efficient way and that
airports are not exerting their monopoly power and are providing the services required by
users at a reasonable price.
Given the trend toward airport privatization, government responsibility should be
directed toward the establishment of a regulatory policy that would channel private sector
performance so that it matches public interests. In this sense, the use of indicators may
contribute to  the  evaluation of  such an  accomplishment. In  the  British case (BAA),
privatization brought clear management efficiency improvements, mainly at airports in
London. Nevertheless, the Monopolies and Merger Commission may carry out controls at
these airports with the aim of determining  if their monopoly  power is being exerted against
public interests. The main criticisms relate to the following three areas: (i) service quality,
(ii) fares structure and levels, and (iii) investment levels and quality. Other elements not
subject to regulation,  such as rents, licenses and commercial  concessions are controlled by a
commission as well. This was of great importance due to the tough regulation applied on
BAA airports,  which resulted in aeronautical  charges that were below associated costs, and
a need to cross subsidize these services with revenues arising from commercial activities.
As a consequence, in order to complement the aeronautical-side  deficit, users had to pay
monopoly  prices in commercial  areas, and thus subsidize  air transport carriers.
46According  to the literature on airport industry management, financial and economic
indicators are usually the most utilized (see Ashford and Moore, 1992, and Doganis, 1992).
Given that one of the main objectives of a private firm is costs minimization, a useful
measure of efficiency must cover financial aspects. Economic objectives such as inputs
productivity are also of importance for any industry. Therefore, a  menu of economic
indicators is also necessary. Nevertheless, as we have indicated above, these indicators
should be complemented by other measures that would allow for an  evaluation of the
airport services and activities that may lead to troubles for users. Elements such as quality
of service and negative airport externalities should be considered as well. For instance,
waiting times or congestion at the terminal building are of primary importance in users
perception of service quality.
5.2.- Elements  that determine  indicators design
Before we propose a  set  of indicators, some  aspects that  directly affect their
utilization have to be pointed out. First, airports develop similar activities for different
objectives. In addition, these objectives may conflict with one another. For example, an
increase in airport runway capacity through the establishment of additional approaching
routes, would also raise the level of noise. Furthermore,  each airport has a different social,
economic and political environment.  For this reason, to propose a set of indicators without
taking into account the special features of airports is a risky task. Indicators ought to be
adequate  to the social, economic and political characteristics  of each airport. The disparities
between airports  needs to be considered  in order to fix reference standards.
Second, information needed for the calculation of indicators must comply with
certain requirements, such as easy access, clarity and accuracy, in a way that could be
comprehended  by non-specialists.  This should cover most aspects of airports (ICAO, 1991).
It is very important  that this evaluation  and control process be carried out as an integral part
of the airport planning program, and not merely as a means for assessing private manager
responsibilities. Of course, there is a  conflict due to  information asymmetry, with the
private operator having an incentive to hide relevant information from the regulator. This
situation might be softened  by periodical controls allowing for continuous supervision with
reference  to reasonable services  standards.
A troublesome element in the evaluation of airport performance  and productivity is
defining the output utilized. An airport output is not homogenous.  It can be defined in terms
of  number of planes, passengers and  cargo volumes. However, each of these output
measures is only related to a part of the infrastructure.  Runways are related to the number of
landed aircraft, while terminal building size depends upon the amount of passengers and
cargo processed. Therefore, none of these measures taken in isolation comprehensively
explain airport costs and revenues.
Doganis (1992) argues that the choice of output must be  in accordance with its
economic importance in terms of revenues and costs generation. In this sense, for most
airports around the world, the greatest proportion occurs in activities developed in the
47terminal building, such as passengers and cargo handling. Therefore, an output measure  that
combines both variables would cover the largest proportion of airport revenues and costs.
Passengers and cargo volumes are an indirect measure of the total number of processed
aircraft. Actually, the variable "work-load units" (WLU) is frequently used as an adequate
measure of airport output. A work-load unit corresponds either to a passenger (80 Kg.
average weight plus 20 Kg. of luggage) or to 100 Kg. of cargo. However, it is important to
note that a passenger or a 100 Kg. unit of cargo do not require the same use of physical and
financial resources, and do not generate the same revenues either. On the other hand, some
indicators demand a given output  measure. For example, when assessing  revenues arising at
commercial  activities, the use of traffic units in the denominator  does not make sense.
Output measures are relatively easy to obtain, consequently there should not be any
problems in obtaining the necessary data required by indicators. In turn, input measures
give rise to more serious problems. The most important inputs at airports are labor and
capital. Regarding the former, the easiest measure is provided by the number of workers.
However, this is not homogenous, as it includes both part- and full-time personnel, in
addition to qualified workers such as technicians and managers, and unskilled personnel.
Therefore,  given that different types of workers carry out different tasks at airports, it would
be necessary to develop a more comprehensive  and accurate measure for determining the
labor input. A solution may be found in considering the financial value of the input (see
Doganis, 1992).  Nevertheless, such a measure also presents considerable  problems since it
reflects not only the quantity of the input applied, but also the relative wage differentials
armong  airports. This further complicates the use  of  indicators that serve  as  standard
references. Consequently,  the utilization  of the number of workers as a measure of the labor
input is advisable. The number of workers, however, would need to be properly classified
in order to evaluate a particular area. For example, if aeronautical  revenues per unit of labor
input is to  be calculated, it is convenient to  incorporate in the denominator only those
workers directly involved in the activities.
Regarding the  capital factor, the  situation is  even more complicated. This  is
essentially due to the diverse nature of capital inputs. For instance, the difference arising
between small capital resources with a short economic  life and large long term investments
such as runways and buildings, makes posterior input allocation very difficult to measure.
ICAO recommends the utilization of assets value in order to measure capital. However, the
existence of diverse accounting  methods means care will have to be taken. For example, if
capital  goods investments are financed  by  government funds,  it  is  very  likely that
depreciation would not be entered into the accounts. This procedure is common at those
airports traditionally operated as public firms. Determining asset value at such airports is
misleading due to  a lack of regular accounting practices. Nevertheless, although it is
difficult  to  trust  financial  measurements of  capital,  there  is  no  alternative. As  a
consequence,  if the evaluation of inputs is to become more reliable, the whole industry will
need to adopt a common accounting  system.
485.3.- Performance  indicators of airport infrastructures
The performance  indicators presented  in this work are commonly used in the airport
industry. However, in some cases it might be necessary to make a selection or an ad hoc
design according to the special airport features and services to be assessed. Although the
proposed list is not exhaustive, it intends to  cover those aspects or areas that might be
problematic for regulators or managers. There are particular areas where the infringement
of public interests is more likely. For example, at airports subject to price regulation,  there
are problems regarding incentives for investing in new capacity and with the quality of
service.  This is the result of strong operator tendencies  toward reducing costs at the expense
of service quality. Therefore, it is important to  have a  set of financial and economic
indicators available  that would help in analyzing airport performance.  These could include
costs coverage,  profitability, asset investments and the use of available  resources.
In Table 5.  1, a set of financial indicators is presented. Two groups are distinguished.
The first are the strategic indicators that are needed to evaluate policies with medium and
long  term effects,  such  as  return  on  capital  investments.  Secondly, other financial
indicators,  where measures such as cash-flow provide an accurate evaluation of the day to
day financial  situation of the airport.
Table 5.1. Financial performance  indicators
*Rcturn on capital investment
*Payback period
Strategic indicators  *Current assets/Liabilities
*Self financing  ratio
*Debtors and creditors ratio
C  -hiows
Source: Lemaitre  (1997)
Efficiency economic indicators are shown at Table 5.2. These are classified into six
distinct categories: overall costs performance, labor productivity, productivity of capital
employed, revenue-generating performance, performance of  commercial activities and
overall profitability.  In order to asses the economic  efficiency of an airport through time, or
to check whether regulated standards are being met, specific indicators are required. For
example, we might need to explore labor and capital productivity if we wish to establish
that resources are being used in the most efficient way. Alternatively, to  determine the
49performance of commercial areas, it  is necessary to  have  specific revenue indicators
(Doganis, 1992).
Table 5.2. Economic and productivity indicators
*Total cost per WLU (after depreciation  and interest)
*Operating  costs  per  WLU  (excluding  depreciation  and
interest)
*Capital cost per WLU
Overall cost performance indicators  *Labor cost per WLU
*Labor costs as percentage  of total costs
*Capital costs as percentage  of total costs
*Aeronautical costs per WLU
*Capital costs to value added ratio
*Labor costs per employee
*WLU per employee
*Total revenue per employee
Labor productivity  indicators  oValue added per employee
*Value added per unit of staff plus capital costs
oValue added per unit of staff costs
*Value added per unit of capital costs
Productivity of capital employed  *WLU per £1,000 net asset value
oTotal revenue per £1,000 net asset value
oTotal revenue per WLU
*Adjusted revenue per WLU
Revenue generation  performance  eAeronautical (or non-aeronautical)  revenue as a percentage of
total revenue
*Aeronautical  revenue per WLU
*Non-aeronautical  revenue per WLU
oConcession  plus rental income per passenger
*Concession  revenue per passenger
oRent or lease income per passenger
Performance  of commercial  activities  *Concession  revenue per m2
*Rent or lease income per m2
*Airport concession revenue as percentage of concessionaires'
turnover
Profitability measures  *Surplus or deficit per WLU
*Revenue to expenditure ratio
Source:  Doganis (1992)
50Revenues from leasing, licenses and concessions derive from activities that are not
subject to regulation. However, these activities must also be evaluated since they might
generate  issues that are against the public interest. For example,  if rents paid by commercial
area tenants are excessive in comparison to other rents in the leases market, it might be
necessary  to impose controls. Aeronautical charges are determined according to the single
till approach. Under such an approach, airport costs and revenues are foreseen to take into
account all services. Aeronautical charges are fixed in such a way as to permit a given
profitability level that, in tum, depends upon previous costs and revenues estimations.  Once
the regulatory pricing formula is in place, the private operator might increase rents above
those charged in commercial  areas, and hence, act against public interests.
As we have already mentioned, if airports are subject to price regulation they may
also be tempted to reduce service quality, and consequently their costs. Therefore, it is
crucial to investigate the perception users have about the services provided at airports.
Before carrying out any quality assessment, it is necessary to  define a standard level of
service that would be feasible and reasonable. Such standards would permit the airport
regulator, under a penalty threat, to demand the attainment  of a certain level of service.
In the British case, air carriers have argued that it is necessary to reach agreement
regarding the standard level of services,  as well as for provisions that would entitle them to
compensation  in case of non-fulfillment. They maintain that any deviation from standards
would affect their service quality and that without compensation such a mechanism would
not be effective.  BAA, however, argues that airport services are provided  jointly by airport
operators and airlines and, therefore, the level of services do not depend entirely upon its
performance, but also upon air carriers and handling staff. Carriers, in turn, argue that
penalties must be applicable only to BAA, given that airlines operate in a competitive
environment  and  have  strong  incentives  to  maintain  and  improve  their  quality.
Nevertheless,  in spite of this dispute, it is not quite clear whether the airport operator should
be solely responsible for the attainment of standard levels of quality. In any case, a key
aspect of  this  compensatory mechanism is  identifying who  is  responsible for  non-
achievement  of standards. Leaving aside these difficulties, in order to guarantee a certain
level of service within the context of regulation, it is essential that an agreement regarding
quality standards  be reached.
The procedures for evaluating the factors determining the level of service in the
terminal building are complex, leading to the use of such variables as "time of service" and
"level of congestion" as proxies for the quality of services provided. Nevertheless, Table
5.3. shows a  set of quality indicators that comprise an important part of most of the
conflictive aspects  of airport activities.
In a study carried out at Birmingham airport (see Mumayiz and Ashford, 1986), it
was established  that users perception of time of service depended upon the type of market.
For European scheduled flights, a  check-in waiting time  of  7.5 minutes or  less was
considered satisfactory, while a time equal or greater than 14 minutes was perceived as
intolerable. For charter flights, these limits would be  respectively between 11 and  21
minutes. According  to the same study, a general waiting time of not more than 12 minutes
would indicate a satisfactory level of service.
51However, there is a trade-off between the level of service offered and its costs. The
higher the level of service, the higher the amount of resources required. If we could identify
all  or  some costs associated with  the time  wasted by  passengers at queues, and  the
economic resources wasted as a consequence of this waiting period, it would be possible to
assess the losses arising from the level of services provided. In summary, the establishment
of an inadequate  level of service could negatively influence  users and even airport interests.
An illustrative example is provided by the check-in service. The more time  spent by
passengers in front of check-in counters, the less time available for  shopping in the airport
commercial  area.
Table 5.3. Quality of service indicators
ff;Ef-:XA;f!000  ttat00000ff;;;0T00  ft4 iV0  L;t;.i'Time  of  service  ':hckin  tm,luggage  divfery  timse
Delays  *Waiting  time~~~~~~~intie,IUP&
0: 0000  000;:5  t0tt0:  000000  0000:;  00000  0000  ;00t;i  '0Costs for ps eng  ers offo  d  a  d0  0  dr  0ink  00i00);00;0
Costs  'Departure~~~*C  fee
*Conetd  e
Source:  Lemaitrt  (1997)  adapted.
The use of indicators as tools for assessing a given activity is ineffective if there are
no reference standards delineating acceptable performance margins. However, once the
particular features of each airport are taken into consideration, these "desirable" or "best
practice" reference standards should be considered as provisional guides only. There is not
a unique optimum level for a given indicator. The appropriate and optimal reference level
depends upon the circumstances of  each airport. Furthermore, there may  be conflicts
between the different objectives pursued. For example, an improvement in the level of
52quality may require a substantial increase in costs, which would eventually be translated
into higher fares. After considered these arguments, it remains important to reconcile the
establishment and implementation of indicator reference standards. Table 5.4. gives some
examples of indicators and their associated standards.
Table 5.4. Examples of reference  standard levels
Financial  Return  on capital  investment  > 1.0
LAbor  prou-tvit  20P0  r  yZ  to
[Number  of square meters per occupant at  25-35  (international)
Service  quality  jpeak  hours  1  6-20  (national)
Source:  Adapted form various studies.
Doganis and Graham (1995) have carried out evaluations of the economic and
commercial  aspects of 25 European airports  through the application of a set of performance
indicators. 3'  The  authors  emphasize the  existence of  comparability problems due  to
differences in the activities developed at airports in the study. They try to  lessen the
problem through corrections aimed at allowing for a consideration of the whole group as
operators of the same activities. 32 The sample includes private airports such as Glasgow,
partially privatized ones such as Copenhagen, publicly owned but commercially oriented
airports such as Geneva, and airports like Stockholm, which is part of the Swedish Civil
Aviation Authority. The main objective of  this  study was to  analyze the trends  and
development of industry performance, and identify the relationship between profitability
and type of airport. Airports with different ownership structures and varying sizes were
incorporated  into the study. Table 5.5 provides a summary  of the results of this study.
Finally, it should be pointed out that differences in the type of services developed in
airports, such as in the degree of public intervention, accounting  systems, financial sources,
subsidies and standards, complicates  the use of indicators for assessing airport performance.
In addition, there are two important features that affect airport operations and are present in
the evaluation of the resources applied. The first concerns the impossibility of storing
airport output, which inevitably leads to a lessening in capacity The second feature has to
do with airport externalities. For instance, the level of noise might induce a ban on night
activities, which would lead to under-capacity use and an,increase in average costs. All
these  elements,  combined  with  the  geographic,  economic,  social  and  political
characteristics  of the airport region, hinders airport performance  assessment.
3  Airports included in the study were: Amsterdam, Stockholm, Barcelona, Birmingham, Bilbao, Basel
Mulhouse, Copenhagen, Cardiff, Dublin, Dusseldorf, East Midlands, Oslo, Frankfurt, Glasgow, Geneva,
Gatwick, Heathrow,  Lisbon, Madrid,  Manchester, Milan, Nice, Newcastle, Vigo and Vienna.
3  Adjustments carried out in the  study indicate that results must be  carefully analyzed. Comparability
problems are still present, and consequently  each airport should be considered according to  its context.
53Table 5.5. European  airports best and worst practice values
fCost  indicators:f;;  ;;;t0f  ;  0;tXX0g S 0;f000000tX00000  i,j000  ;300  iL  LX 
'Total cost  per WLU  Mso  2ulhous  e  143  o  294
'Operating  cotper  WLV3  Vieana  10W  58  Oso  1,94
'  ital  cost per  WVLU  6  Oslo  0.99
*Nt  rMnet  ves  a  e  n U  d 
alt  _  L  as.sbetn  S  ,  ,.;  S *  , ; 5
po  _  Vigo;  g;  ;.12  GlpWkk  >  65
Source: Prepared with data from Doganis  and Graharn (1995)
*Note: Monetary values  are expressed  in US dollars.
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